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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Mafia is a phenomenon that has affected Italy for long and in many different aspects. 
Particularly, it has led to a spiral that first affected industrial productivity and reputation, and later 
led to considerable reductions in investments toward our territory. Although the primary economic 
nature of the phenomenon, this field of study has not addressed the investigation of the causes and 
effects thoroughly. Thus, among social sciences, economics has contributed very limitedly to 
understand the phenomenon mafia and its economic impact. 
I have undertaken the challenge for several reasons. First, it is my intention to provide a 
comprehensive framework of information in order to shed a light on the main roots at the origins of 
Mafia. Additionally, I believe that a better comprehension of the phenomenon can lead to more 
sound policies and behavior that may curb the damages. This can help not only to point the right 
directions of future research, but also to attract other scholars and readers to the subject. 
The first two chapters contain a comprehensive literature review of the contributions made 
by the scholars to the understanding of the phenomenon of Mafia. The review is built upon both old 
and new publications and studies that propose different and evolving perspectives on Mafia. It is 
worth noticing that the less recent publications are important because they build the basis for 
studying the origins of Mafia. Additionally, these papers play a fundamental role in providing the 
rare quantitative data that are available on the subject. More recent sparks on the subject concern 
spatial studies of the diffusion of Mafia and few more recent appraisals. 
Following a long and deep research on the subject, I decided to address the study from three 
different dimensions: cultural, sociological-institutional, and economical. It would be a mistake to 
analyze and understand Mafia without accounting for the inevitable interactions that take place 
among these three spheres of the society. Indeed, while Mafia is often considered a cultural factor, it 
has long roots in the local and national institutions and strong impacts on the economy and society. 
Thus, the only way to provide a clear picture is to merge these perspectives into a coherent 
framework of analysis that includes these three determinants. 
The third chapter considers the above determinants of Mafia and reports the associated 
literature on the origins, diffusion and development of the phenomenon in Italy. Due to the unique 
nature of Mafia and the small attention dedicated to it by scholars over the years, quantitative data 
goes back a long time. It is with Damiani (1881) and Cutrera (1900) that we have the first attempts 
to create a dataset in order to study the subject from a more economic and robust perspective. This 
data have been the very basis for the analysis of Mafia until now. In that chapter, I summarize the 
5 
main uses and results based on this data. The aim is not a comparative one, but rather an attempt of 
assessing the state of this specific stream of research. 
After these quantitative and qualitative connotation of the nature and origins of the 
phenomenon, I move to the fourth chapter. This contains the needed historical facts that lead to an 
understanding of the path that followed Mafia to achieve its current status. I adopt a three-period 
division of the history of Mafia, which roughly goes hand-to-hand with the evolution of the country 
of Italy. First, the liberal state that have proven to be an extremely fertile territory for the rise of this 
criminal organization. Indeed, the weak powers of the local governments and almost absent national 
one have facilitated the first diffusion of Mafia-type organizations. Later, during the Fascist period, 
which governed Italy from the early ‘20s to the end of WWII, Mafia has had its toughest period as 
the regime included them as enemy of the state and tried to push back its expansionary phase. 
Immediately after the end of the war, Mafiosi recognized the opportunity that the birth of the 
Republic represented to expands its activities and profits. Especially in the period following WWII 
it has developed a strong structure around illicit drug trafficking and public procurement. Some 
historical trials have marked the turning point for judicial authorities that gathered huge quantity of 
information about the phenomenon. Finally I briefly report the origins of Camorra and 'Ndrangheta 
in order to give some insights and references about those Mafia-type organizations. 
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Chapter 2 
The determinants of Mafia 
 
 The scope of this chapter is to provide an outline of the complex determinants at the roots of 
Mafia. Here, I will summarize the alternative hypotheses of different scholars who tried to explain 
this phenomenon. Particularly, I propose a tentative classification according to the nature of Mafia 
determinants, namely economic, cultural or socio-institutional ones. Among the bibliographical 
sources giving rise to the social literature, the inquiry by Franchetti and Sonnino
1
 (1877) was a 
seminal contribution . The publication of this inquiry took place right after the institution of the 
“Giunta per l’inchiesta sulle condizioni sociali ed economiche della Sicilia”. and the related report 
of Bonfadini
2. The “Giunta” is a body of the Italian parliament appointed to technical-juridical 
consultancy that should guarantee the parliamentary impartiality. Despite the fact that it is not a 
legislative body, the members are named by the presidents of the parliamentary chambers. In 
particular, this body was created to investigate the social-economical conditions of Sicily. 
 During my readings, I have hardly found a unique definition of Mafia common to alternative 
authors. Conversely many definitions, although partly contradicting, share common traits in 
describing a specific aspect of this phenomenon; meanwhile, Among the many alternative 
definitions, Franchetti proposed a compelling one in order to capture the complexity of the 
phenomenon : 
“unione di persone d’ogni grado, d’ogni professione, d’ogni specie, che, senza avere nessun legame 
apparente, continuo e regolare, si trovano sempre riunite per promuovere il reciproco interesse, astrazione 
fatta da qualunque considerazione di legge, di giustizia e di ordine pubblico, è un sentimento medioevale di 
colui che crede di poter provvedere alla tutela ed alla incolumità della sua persona e dei suoi averi mercé il 
suo valore e la sua influenza personale indipendentemente dall’azione dell’autorità e delle leggi”. 
(Franchetti, 1876, pg. 63) 
 From this perspective it is clear that Mafia involves many spheres of society; consequently, 
finding the causes attributable to the origins and the development of this phenomenon is a multi-
faceted and complex issue. Indeed, it is characterised by “un sistema di violenza e di illegalità 
finalizzato all'accumulazione del capitale e all'acquisizione e gestione di posizioni di potere, che si avvale di 
un codice culturale e gode di un certo consenso sociale” (Santino, 2006, pg. 246). Comparing the two 
definitions, Mafia is conceived as a social phenomenon, involving people with apparent lack of 
                                               
1Sonnino, Sidney and Leopoldo Franchetti, 1877. La Sicilia nel 1876, Firenze, Tip. di G. Barbera 
2Bonfadini, Romualdo, 1876. Relazione della Commissione Parlamentare, Inchiesta sulle Condizioni Sociali ed 
Economiche della Sicilia, Roma 
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commonality of interests which indeed promoted their common interests independently from 
legislation, justice and juridical authority. Additionally, it characterised by a cultural-historical 
background called here “sentimento medioevale”, which is peculiar of people following the Honour 
code; that is, the ability to provide self-protection to their family's members without the intervention 
of legal authorities. According to Santino there are fundamental economic, political and social 
objectives that are not negligible when analysing Mafia activities. 
Common criminal organisation should not be confused with Mafia since the latter is inherently 
much more connected with local populations and it showed a general capability to adapt its core 
activities to socio-institutional changes. 
In order to better understand how Mafia differs from “normal” criminal organization, one could get 
a first insight looking at the Italian juridical definition. In particular, for the first time the law 
number 646 of 1982, the so called Law Rognoni-La Torre, introduced for the first time in the Italian 
penal code the crime known as “associazione a delinquere di stampo Mafioso” by means of the 
article 416 bis An antecedent legislation to this first disposition against Mafia’s organizations is the 
law number 575 of 1965. The law could be applied also to people suspected to be part of a Mafia 
association. From the website of the Chamber of Deputies
3
, I report here part of the article 416 bis, 
included in the II Book, V Title of the Italian Penal Code: 
“Chiunque fa parte di un'associazione di tipo mafioso formata da tre o più persone, è punito con la 
reclusione da sette a dodici anni. L'associazione è di tipo mafioso quando coloro che ne fanno parte si 
avvalgono della forza di intimidazione del vincolo associativo e della condizione di assoggettamento e di 
omertà che ne deriva per commettere delitti, per acquisire in modo diretto o indiretto la gestione o 
comunque il controllo di attività economiche, di concessioni, di autorizzazioni, appalti e servizi pubblici o 
per realizzare profitti o vantaggi ingiusti per sé o per altri, ovvero al fine di impedire od ostacolare il libero 
esercizio del voto o di procurare voti a sé o ad altri in occasione di consultazioni elettorali.” 
The article 416, instead, referred to the criminal conspiracy in general and establish shorter 
reclusion than article 416 bis. Here I report part of the article: 
“Quando tre o più persone si associano allo scopo di commettere più delitti, coloro che promuovono o 
costituiscono od organizzano l'associazione sono puniti, per ciò solo, con la reclusione da tre a sette anni.” 
Thanks to the previous articles, it is possible to grasp the fundamental differences, produced by the 
Italian legislature, between the two regulations. The second one refers to association which has as 
goal the general commitment of crimes independently on the application of violence and the respect 
of omertà, known also as silence code. Another key difference between the two kind of associations 
is reflected in the community involvement in illegal activity. In effect Mafia had always shown a 
                                               
3www.camera.it 
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deep bond with population. In fact, Omertà is defined by Domenico Navacco as “the passive 
behaviour towards the investigating judge: behaviours almost ironic, in order to make him understand the 
impotence of the legal system”4. Clearly, it is a consequence of both fear of retaliation and distrust 
towards civil servants. 
Nonetheless, in the bibliographic research I have done here, the previous distinction sometimes had 
disappeared and Mafia was defined as a criminal organisation without specifying its particular 
features taking the law into consideration, as well. 
Mafia’s determinants 
By defining the Mafia phenomenon, scholars attempted to explain Mafia’s origins by focusing on 
different determinants, and I have tried to gather them into the following three categories: cultural, 
institutional-sociological and economic. 
The cultural ones refer to characteristics of the civil life, social relationships and general values that 
are specific to some geographical area and population. Cultural factors are direct consequences of 
local political histories, social and physical conditions that are fundamental to the long development 
of a culture of Mafia, the so called “il sentire mafioso”. More specifically, it is characterized by a 
generic despise of social and civic rights, moreover based on physical and moral violence since, in 
this context, the “law of the jungle” is in force. The typical facts highlighting these cultural 
determinants are: i) the ability to spy and control on some activities as agriculture, ii) the general 
tolerance of the use of violence and, iii) in order to solve the disputes “it is preferred the intervention 
of somebody able to manage the violence instead of somebody officially entitled to do it”5. We could affirm 
that the low level of reciprocal confidence among members of a society and the tolerance of 
violence as a means to solve problems are the main cultural features of Sicilian population. Omertà 
is a word that could potentially describe such behaviours but it would be an over-simplification to 
say that Omertà is just part of the Sicilian culture. It is crucial to consider the institutional and 
sociological transformation experienced since the Greek and Roman domination
6
 until the Spanish 
and the Bourbon one. This events undermined the collaboration and trust towards the new ruling 
class. The fear for retaliation should not be included into a cultural framework as omertà, but as a 
consequence of something different, as the lack of control over violence from the government. Pitrè 
(1889)
7
 defined the word omertà as 
“L’omertà è un sentimento tutto proprio, che consiste nel rendersi indipendente dalle leggi sociali [...] nel 
                                               
4Navacco, 1972, pg. 49 
5Joeseph Bonanno, Man of Honour, 1983, pg47 
6Cutrera, A. (1900). La Mafia ei mafiosi: origini e manifestazioni. A. Reber. pg. 2 
7Pitrè, 1889, pg. 294 ed. 1993 
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risolvere tutte le controversie o con la forza, o tutto al più con l’arbitrato dei più potenti rappresentanti la 
omertà della contrada”. Another interpretation arised from Cutrera (1900, pg,71) that called the 
indifference “difronte ad un crimine contro la polizia come “indifferentismo musulmano, che 
disgraziatamente ancora si manifesta nel carattere del siciliano, come triste retaggio del lontano dominio”. 
However, Paolo Pezzino (1995) believed that this word comes from the Italian word “umiltà” and 
brought to an imposed conduct, as it is the fear for any form of retaliation. Thus, we could think 
about omertà as a code of silence but we are not able to discern if the conduct is innate in the person 
character, or if it descends from the fear for negative consequences(if it is an intrinsic or an external 
habit ). It is a cultural aspect when the silence code is endorsed by the common folk, while it is 
more a consequence of violence when it is practised under the threat of violence or real violence. 
However, it is undoubtedly true that this attitude can be envisaged from some historical events. But, 
cultural factors are not sufficiently exhaustive to explain the presence of Mafia. 
In societies where inhabitants show a clear distrust toward the political body and juridical justice, 
institutional-sociological determinants are crucial to understand the conditions generating the 
complex clientelism system. In fact, the presence of Mafia was characterized by a permanent 
control over local activities, administrative decisions and juridical power. In order to influence so 
many spheres of the social organization it is necessary to set up a strong relational and 
interconnected network between institutions and Mafia, as well as between institutions and 
population The earliest evidences of the difficult institutional-sociological context are brought by 
Villari, Franchetti and Damiani. For example, local public administration have the power to 
subcontract public works and this make possible to manage and to address huge investments in 
favour of a specific person or group. The personal interest of the Mafioso join those of the civil 
servant or those of the local politician: this is how private interests overcome the public ones. In 
principle, the scope of the public administration is to mediate among population and the ruling class 
in order to understand their needs. Once the needs are precisely individuated, the legislative body 
should create proper laws which are supposed to be well enforced in order to satisfy the above-
mentioned needs. What happened, since the very first crucial trial, e.g. Notarbartolo case, was that 
Mafia members were able to influence the the legislative power in order to get unpunished. 
Finally, the economic determinants are those economic reasons that allowed and promoted mafia’s 
emergence and development. Possible economic determinants are the poverty of peasants, the 
burden of tax imposition, the advantages of self-organization and illegal behaviours in commercial 
trade as, for example, the imposition of violence in order to buy citrus fruits at lower prices. Mafia 
organization was able to configured herself as the entity responsible to ensure and control economic 
relationships, making some part, or both, better off. But, when described only as a functionalistic 
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organization, that reasoning fell short of fully explaining the roots of the Mafia phenomenon. . In 
fact, the economic reasons for the origins of Mafia are, in some cases, the most evident as well as 
the first noticeable features . This means that the analysis of economic determinants could brought 
to very ambiguous outcome. 
During the XIX century, Sicily was predominantly an agrarian society and the land was mainly 
divided into large estates, that is, latifundium. The 'procuratore generale' (judge advocate 
general/solicitor general) Morena stated that: 
“il sistema della proprietà divisa è eminentemente moralizzatore, essendo insito nel cuore dell'uomo il 
desiderio di avere un pezzo di terra ove sia sul suo; là egli innalza la sua casa, là diventa padre e con gli 
alberi da lui piantati vede crescere rigogliosi I suoi figliuoli; là egli [...] diventa uomo d'ordine e di libertà 
ma non è tutto: il sistema della proprietà del terreno dimezzato non solamente moralizza proprietari e 
agricoltori ma , direi quasi, purifica la campagna e con essa l'atmosfera, creando la necessità di aprirvi 
strade, di attirarvi acque, di edificarvi una chiesa, di chiamarvi un medico, un prete, un conciliatore, una 
stazione di carabinieri, di istituirvi insomma un centro di lavoro e di attività, di moralità e sicurezza 
pubblica, tale da rendere impossibile qualunque siasi sodalizio di malandrinaggio, da respingere qualunque 
scorreria di briganti.”8 
However, I have gathered into the economic determinants also the geographical ones as well as soil 
suitability, availability of water and commercial trade opportunities. Unfortunately, the easy 
association of the latifundium as the clear precursor of the emergence of Mafia is not verified. Apart 
for latifundium, also areas characterised by many small properties had shown a high and strong 
Mafia presence. This evidences led to a wide discussion around the theme of latifundium. The 
dissolution of ecclesiastic corporations, the imposition of new taxes after 1861 worsened the 
peasants financial situation and increased a desire of self-regulation. 
In what follows, I shall address the presentation and discussion of the above mentioned cultural, 
socio-institutional and economic Mafia determinants. My research is mainly based on the works by 
Franchetti and Sonnino (1876), Villari (1878), Damiani (1881), Pitrè (1889), Colajanni (1900), 
Cutrera (1900), Gambetta (1993), Lupo (1993), Pezzino (1999) and Santino (2006), Ciconte (2008). 
In order to fix the key concept included in each set: 
Cultural   
Sicilian character as a set of behaviour and anthropological features 
recognizable among Sicilians. Historical factors that have shaped civil 
life, social relationships and general values are specific to local 
geographical area and population. Cultural factors could be summed in 
                                               
8Morena Carlo, Relazione statistica dei lavori compiuti nel distretto della Corte di Appello di Palermo nell'anno 1877, 
Palermo, Barravecchia, 1878. cited in “Alongi, G. La Maffia [1886]. Palerme: Sellerio pg. 17” 
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the so called “il sentire mafioso” characterized by a lack of social and 
civic rights. Physical and moral violence are tolerated. 
Sociological-institutional 
Characteristic of weak institution are the absent public control over 
local activities, administrative decisions and juridical power. 
Especial weight is given to weak defence of property rights; the fall 
of feudal system in 1812, the administrative reforms of 1817 
dividing Sicily into districts; the impossibility for the peasants to 
enter the political authorities implied growing class divides; their 
misunderstanding of the liberal policy. 
Economical 
The economic structure of the fields, e.g latifundium, the profitable 
trade of valuable crops, e.g. sulphur and citrus fruits, and general poor 
conditions of peasants are a reasons that allowed and promoted 
Mafia’s emergence and development. The advantages of self-
organization and illegal behaviours in commercial trade in order to buy 
at lower prices are some economical determinants. 
 
2.1. Cultural determinants 
Mafia’s origins are connected to legendary narratives , whereof the most famous fairy tale is the 
history of “Osso, Mastrosso, Carcagnosso”, three Spanish knights, members of a secret society 
called Guarduña, founded in Toledo on 1412. It was a military order equipped with strict rules and 
so powerful to influence the Spanish political system. Seemingly, during the 15
th
 century, the three 
men sought to revenge the honour of their sister, offended by an act of blood, by killing the culprit. 
According to the story, they were imprisoned in the Island of Favignana for 29 years, organizing the 
body of norms, behaviours and social rules which will be at the origins of the three famous Italian 
Mafia-type organizations. After this period, the three knights of this legend came out of prison as 
new men, that were different between them but they were all linked by a common thread: the code 
and honour of silence. Osso went to Sicily and set up Cosa Nostra, Mastrosso founded the 
‘Ndrangheta in Calabria, while Carcagnosso had built the basic structure of Camorra (Ciconte, 
2008). These different Mafia-type organizations had some similarities in their rituals, habits and 
traditions which are all associated to the concept of honour and silence code. These kinds of 
narratives are fundamental for the creation of myths and to build up a sense of noble origins among 
the members. In fact, this history could establish a strong tie which will affect the imminent culture 
12 
and the ideology about Mafia-type organizations. This legend is thus important also because it is the 
first history gathering the three main Italian Mafia-type organisations under similar characteristics 
as vow, initiation rituals, jargon and specific languages. Possibly, the mixture of Sacral icons and 
profane ones helped the diffusion of some rituals, “it might give to the symbol a strong value and 
prestige” (Ciconte, 2008, p. 22)9. 
Together with mythological orgins, there are cultural determinants advanced by Damiani
10
 
(Damiani-Jacini, 1881) which focus on the effects purported by subsequent phases of dominations. 
He highlighted the long stranger domination of Sicily as one of the aspect which shape local culture 
the most. He advanced that Sicilians, being always dominated by stranger, had developed a non-
civic-minded and a surrender attitude to new domination. He stressed the Island to be a world in 
which the negative effects of the feudal system are still present. The Arabs succeed the Byzantines 
and dominated from 827 for almost two centuries boosting the agrarian development of the Island; 
in 1091, the Normans expel the Arabs and they instituted fiefs mainly distributed among barons and 
bishopric; from 1194 to 1268 Hohenstaufens and from 1268 1282 the House of Anjou ruled the 
island; from 1282 to 1713 the Spanish domination interrupted for some year by the House of Savoy 
that stayed there until 1720; the Austrians Viceroys until 1734 and the Bourbons rule from Naples 
until 1860
11
. 
Also the Bonfadini's inquiry presents evidence in favour of the hypothesis that long period of 
dominations, fostering the rise of a non-civic minded, could be at the hearth of the emergence of 
Mafia. The event of a public inquiry, held by Bonfadini (1876) was a non-negligible fact for 
peasants, that had seemingly looked, with suspicious and perhaps mistrustful, at the Lombard 
official. Due to its public nature and context, asking to local authorities and landowners about the 
social conditions in the island, the replies could be slightly misleading. This brought theoretical 
distortion among the replies but is still the first useful collection of data about rural and urban 
Sicilian centres. In their final relation, latifundium is not supposed to be the explanation for 
banditry presence while culture, is advanced as the main aspect for understanding the phenomenon 
of Mafia and their social lives. He wrote that “qui la natura, ha vinto con le sue forze l'efficacia della 
legge e della scienza” (Bonfadini, 1876, pg. 1077). 
For Franchetti (1876), local policy and administration are the main factors causing the emergence 
of Mafia, but he did not neglect the importance of common habits, perception and trust among 
classes. The evidences of a diffused use of violence and the related acceptance of it, on behalf of the 
                                               
9Ciconte, Enzo (2008). 'Ndrangheta. Rubbettino. Pg 22 
10Damiani, A. (1881). 86.“Relazione del delegato tecnico per la Sicilia Abele Damiani,”. Giunta per l’inchiesta agraria 
e sulle condizioni della classe agricola, Atti della Giunta per l’inchiesta agraria e sulle condizioni della classe 
agricola, 86. 
11http://www.initaly.com/regions/sicily/chronol.htm 
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majority of population, worried the economist. In particular the central power was exerted through 
violence, the legal power was perceived as not impartial and mainly based on clientelism. The 
reforms following 1812 were misunderstood and not accepted by both, the peasants and the 
landlords. In particular, the administrative reform of 1817 set 44 articles for “Consigli civici e 
magistrature municipali”, aimed to strengthened local political power. Among these articles the art. 
16, Ch.1 stated: “apparterrà al civico consiglio il proporre i mezzi di provvedere ai bisogni del proprio 
comune”. Another example is given by the subdivision of the Island into 23 districts and 
consequently, communication among institutional bodies changed through the introduction of 
provincial councils. Post Unitarian reforms had negative consequences too, in particular the one of 
1867, 15
th 
august for the Ecclesiastic assets alienation and the reintroduced bread tax. These reforms 
were perceived as the politics of one more foreign ruler which sought the satisfaction of its own 
interest. Especially common folk was unprepared and poorly educated to understand all 
transformation that the reforms wanted to reach. The effect was a total alienation of common folk to 
participate the new local administration and to the redistribution of land properties. The imposition 
of a fiscal system was the reason for which also the aristocrats were unsatisfied: form the one hand, 
it was perceived as the immediate want of central authority to receive taxes, but from the other, 
conscious of its temporary dominion, it did nothing to improve the productive factors or production 
techniques in the fields (Franchetti, 1876). Landowner aristocrats had commanded and controlled 
the common folk for centuries and the abolishment of the feudal system threaten to weaken their 
privileges. After the reforms, they tried to preserve such a control and, they were able to do so 
during the Bourbon kingdom. The reason for that are that the constitution of 1812 was abolished in 
1816, and the administrative reform of 1817 led them to enter the local political bodies maintaining 
influence and control over peasants. The evidence of common dissatisfaction was the revolt of 1820 
that was repressed in blood. 
After 1861, thanks to the liberal ideology of the central authorities, landlords and aristocrats 
exploited the opportunity to enter the political life in order to, either achieve strong positions, and 
maintain pressure over the peasants (Cutrera, 1900, pg. 89). Mafiosi exploited the weak trust of 
population towards new authorities, thus shaping common culture in a distrustfully mood. A further 
determinant for such a distrust is that the official justice, influenced by Mafia members, were 
several times on the side of landowners instead of peasants. Thus, the institutional transformation 
were realized with any effective advantages brought to peasants. This is how Sonnino (1877, pg 
232)
12
 described the situation after the unification: 
“Quella che era stata fino allora potenza legale, rimase come potenza o prepotenza di fatto e il contadino, 
                                               
12Sonnino, Sydney, 1877. La Sicilia nel 1876, I contadini. Firenze, Tip. di G. Barbera 
14 
dichiarato cittadino dalla legge, rimase servo ed oppresso”. 
Due to the general distrust, it was relatively easy for Mafia members to boost an opposition 
behaviour towards the new ruling classes. Social behaviour had already performed in that direction, 
in fact, when someone steal someone else a cattle, the robbed generally aimed the protection of a 
member known for his social influences, or for his affiliated members, rather than the police: in the 
latter case, the institutional justice is substituted by the ‘’private law’’ (Franchetti, 1876). So local 
lords surrounded themselves of violent people in order to protect the castle and the fields, leaving 
them free to abuse their power in different properties and villages. The network between landlords 
and Mafia strengthened so much that, when entered into the political and legal framework, the 
landlord had to defend and help his customers as described by Cutrera (1900 pg. 89): 
“Necessariamente la conquista di questa clientela crea anche degli obblighi, da parte del Capo partito, il 
quale è obbligato di difendere ed aiutare i suoi seguaci in tutti I loro bisogni, in tutte le loro circostanze”. 
The discontent towards the Government was general: from the one hand, the population did not 
trust the government to be an able enforcer; from the other hand, the barons, who lost part of their 
strong property rights, perceived as dangerous the possibility for rural population to get economic 
emancipation ; and finally the aristocrats who abhor the unpunishment of criminal activities and the 
indifference of the government for the decreased productivity of the fields. They started to ally with 
criminals, who were already known, by the people, as “Maffia”. (Franchetti, 1876). 
So, both Damiani, Franchetti and Cutrera found into the culture of Sicilians, something that could 
explain the reasons why Mafia had the opportunities to develop. This cultural peculiarities are 
envisaged in the very long stranger domination which made population alien to the ruling class, far 
from accepting a system of legal norms and an institutional juridical body. 
A different and more recent explanation is given by Rocco Sciarrone (Sciarrone, 1998)
13
 who based 
his theory on the idea of Social Capital as designed by Coleman
14
 and Putnam
15
. In his book he 
analysed Calabria, Puglia and Piedmont focusing on the concept of social capital as the privileged 
mean for Mafia member to acquire power, that is, through external relationships and social network 
that a subject is able to build according to its own interests. Especially the success of Mafia 
activities depended on the cooperation with external members of the group which were politically 
and institutionally influential. In this way they were able to build relationships with other members 
of the society, acquire important positions like to mediate between peasants and landlords. Among 
their “abilities” Mafia members were able to maintain and create a separation between the different 
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classes they were in contact with, namely landlords and peasants. According to Sciarrone, the 
concept of Social Capital is useful to describe Mafia-type organizations since the real force of the 
latter lied in its ability to create networking. This capability shaped Mafia members in acting 
differently according to circumstances, “come mediatori, patroni, protettori in strutture relazionali di 
natura diversa che essi riescono a utilizzare per I propri obiettivi” (Sciarrone, 2009, pg. 47). Central 
importance is thus given to the relational network among Mafia members, politicians and landlords 
which flourished in a fertile background, characterised by a culture based on distrust towards the 
stranger. This create privileges and strong social position which are two keys factors to understand 
the culture of Mafia. This ability to tie important social and political relationships is what allow the 
distinction with any other criminal organization. 
Different was the more recent hypothesis of Henner Hess (1973)
16
, based on the idea of a 
subcultural system which explains both the activities of Mafia and the resistance to change. He 
stated that the agents of Mafia had personal interest in behaving illegally and using violence even if 
they recognized that a collective and coordinated behaviour should brought to a general 
improvement of conditions. Evidences that individualistic behaviour is the rule arose from judicial 
document of XIX century, in particular the so called “Amoroso trial”17 of 1883 and the related 
declaration of the accused, Carmelo Mendola, kept the attention of Hess. From the evidences and 
the declaration arisen during this trial he concluded that Mafia is a conglomerate of “piccole 
associazioni, indipendenti l’una dall’altra, che stanno in reciproca relazione e si aiutano, si accorano, 
agiscono assieme, ma che si possono anche combattere ferocemente” (Hess, 1970, pg. 19). In his idea, 
Mafia is not a strictly organized structure and it based its activities on specific behaviours, called 
“comportamento Mafioso”, meant as particular social practice, as Omertà and Onore18. For its 
influence on justice and the deep relation with politicians, firstly at local level up to the regional 
and national one, Mafia has a sort of stabilizing role in favour of the ruling class and it is able to 
gain from this situation. He defined these behaviours as ‘repressive crime’ and some examples are 
the ballot rigging, terroristic act as Portella della Ginestra in 1947
19
. Hess did not assign specific 
reasons for the rise of such a phenomenon but he defined the basic traits of it. He perceived how 
rarely these crimes were punished and how the global context could be favourable for certain 
groups, as in this case the right party. To sustain the importance of cultural determinants, I referred 
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to the studies of Jane and Peter Schneider (1976)
20
. As already mentioned, Sicily has long been 
represented as a place burdened by cultural values and practices that resist to modernity. Especially 
clientelism, corruption and lack of trust are these cultural features, thereafter, also familyism
21
 was 
said to weight on the island underdevelopment. The study of Schneider et al. (1976) has the purpose 
to represent the multi-faced Sicilian culture, presenting Sicily as burdened by social problems due 
to class divides, especially between landlords and peasants. Since pre-Unitarian Italy, Sicily was a 
strategic wheat producer and exporter, but during XX century it became internationally less and less 
important, and many workers emigrated. During 1815–60, the Neapolitan Bourbons became the 
rulers of Sicily, and they attempted to create a land market, and enclosing common holdings. Their 
successors, the liberal Piedmontese government, who unified Italy in 1860, moved further in this 
sense thanks to the ecclesiastical expropriation of vast properties spread in the island. Nevertheless, 
the new Italian state had no resources, no military forces nor policing capacity able to manage and 
govern transitional chaos. Thus, the authors moved to described the transformation process begun 
after 1860, characterized by frictions between common folk and the Government, that encouraged 
the development of Mafia. They analysed social life, from 1965 to 1967, in Sanbuca di Sicilia, a 
little village called in their studies Villamaura. This village had about 7500 inhabitants, situated in 
the province of Agrigento, had a left party administration and this was rare. Note that, according to 
Antonino Calderone (Arlacchi,1993)
22
, a justice collaborator, “si è sempre saputo che noi (mafiosi) 
non abbiamo niente in comune con i comunisti”. This village was particular as it combined both coastal 
and mountain social features, even though it could be better associated with the inland context since 
it was characterized by large estates and only one national road connected Villamaura to Palermo 
and Agrigento. The authors had both resided the island for long periods attempting anthropological 
researches. They did not neglect economics and social factors influencing the village life, but they 
focused mainly on costumes, honour code, friendship relations and Mediterranean values. From the 
archives of Villamaura, they offered examples of how, through the means of violence and friendship, 
a dishonest contractor ran the public services, as funeral services, streets cleaning or the fish 
market/house. Related to the latter issue, they wrote about auctions and how these were arranged: 
since the beginning, every participant knew when some goods were already “reserved”. They 
stressed all these events to be feasible only through friendship relations, and the common sharing of 
silence code. Technological innovations and modern infrastructures, did not undermine Mafia 
structure, but conversely were cleverly used, adopted and exploited by Mafia members instead: 
“Roads, railroads, telegraph and later telephones, the shift from water driven mills in the countryside to 
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steam, then electric, powered mills in the towns, and the use of refrigerated cells have all enhanced broker 
capitalism without changing the structure of markets. The telephone simply enlarges the field of friends”
23
. 
Concerning the evolution of Mafia, after WWII, labour force engaged in construction increased in 
the whole Sicily, included Villamaura. This was also connected to a higher share of educated 
children that have studied in the biggest town as accountants, agronomists or geometra (draftsmen-
surveyors). The latter position is related to the construction market and almost all geometra, during 
the post-war period, had graduated in Palermo (about 50 students each year), and some of them 
moved back to their villages. The main argument goes around the Sicilian character, historically 
shaped by negative events and continuous domination, with features like a general mistrust of 
central ruler, a tendency to self-satisfy their needs and solve their problems through friendship 
relation and the silence code. Their argument is largely based on their ethnography of Villamaura. 
In this respect, Robert Putnam (1993)
24
 introduced the concept of social capital. Sicilian reluctance 
to change is the fault of governments dating to the thirteenth century, that were at once feudal, 
bureaucratic, and absolutist. He had focused on the role of social capital as the central characteristic 
to understand the negative distortions during societies development as, for instance, the notorious 
Sicilian “lack” of civil consensus and public faith that are clear evidence of poor social capital. 
Other evidences are given by the social acceptance of violence, as well as arbitrary justice and 
corruption. Hence, according to him, the loss of social capital in Southern Italy is due to the 
repeated foreign dominations experienced by Sicilians. In the particular context characterizing “la 
questione meridionale”, the work of Shneider et al. (1976) sketch some aspects that could bring to 
the mind that one of Edward C. Banfield (1958)
25
, a much-criticized work, that allocate the 
particular southern Italy peculiarities to a single behavioural sphere, known as “amoral familyism”. 
However it is not the case to confuse or aggregate their points since the latter ascribe a genetic 
factor to the amoral familyism behaviour, instead Putnam and Shneider both agreed on the 
distortion of past development to be the main factor of low social capital and plurality of culture, 
respectively. Therefore they refused the idea of Banfield for which cultural determinants are shaped 
by a genetic inclination to use violence. 
Raimondo Catanzaro (1975) refused this idea too, and his work sought to explain a point which is 
not addressed directly in the literature, that is, the reasons for the persistence and transformation of 
Mafia. Code of honour and instrumental friendship are cultural features analysed. This honour code 
was useful to train groups and individuals to competitiveness, and it established a particular 
                                               
23Sneider, P and Shneider J. Pg 169 
24
Putnam, Robert, 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton University Press, New 
Jersey. 
25Edward C. Banfield, with the assistance of Laura F. Banfield. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. The Free Press, 
1958.  
18 
perception of government decisions. At the moment of the Italian unification, all these peculiarities 
gave the opportunity to some groups of people, from the periphery, to encounter the Italian state. 
Unfortunately, the following economic development did not bring advantages to the community, 
while it originated Mafia since mainly personal interests were followed. The strong point of the 
author is that cultural code, as well as honour and silence code, “have trained people to the 
competition.
26”. He investigated whether the code of honour and the instrumental friendship were 
modern features arisen from economic and political activities, or from modern social relationship. 
He agreed with Fanchetti about the “social distance” that increased after 1860 and he ascribed it to a 
communication gap, which is cleverly kept constant by Mafia since its advent. Despite this 
agreement he distanced himself from the claim that the mafioso had a feudal sentiment that shaped 
his behaviour. Another point he stressed on was that economic efforts taken by the state in Sicily 
brought a strengthening of Mafia vigour, with no advantages nor improvement of peasants general 
conditions. The central thesis of the paper is hence that Mafia’s strength is given by its ability to 
adapt the social, economic and political transformations happening in society, in a similar pattern of 
Shneider et al. (1976): “Exactly because Mafia behaviours are not relied on past and traditional values, 
the modes of behaviour of the Mafia have been able to adapt to every form of social change that has taken 
place in Sicily”27. Hence, he moved to analyse the hypothesis of archaic and static values behind 
Mafia persistence: if those values were archaic, then they would not have been able to adapt socio-
economical transformations. He analysed the so-called honour code which is, on the one hand, a 
qualified status deriving from the family condition, and so a typical product of social inequality due 
to social stratification. Some examples are: the “effective ability to care about family’s needs and 
properties against exogenous attacks; as well as the protection of the virginity of daughters and the chastity 
of wives”
28
. On the other hand, honour code could also result from an extraordinary individual 
ability to act unpunished. In other words, a man that acquire a social status thanks to some event, as 
the murder of someone who “deserved” it, achieved high reputation using the struggle of honour. 
Instrumental friendship is another aspect analysed by Catanzaro. This relationship could be set up 
for the pleasure of company, or it could be an access-to-resources component too. The latter case is 
configured as an exchange of favours context. It is crucial to create a non-corporate group based on 
trust because, such a friendship allowed for commercial transactions during the pre-unification 
period in Sicily, when these intensified under the Spanish rule. It was necessary for the further 
practice of the honour code, that is, to protect the property land and the family it was necessary to 
establish some friendship relations. Since the basic means of acquiring resources was violence, 
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commercial relationships based on long-lasting trust tended to decrease and, through instrumental 
friendship, Mafia groups could influence the public agencies for private ends. 
The communication gap between the centre ruler class and local ones became really important but it 
was never improved, on the contrary, autonomous power assigned to the island, made them move 
far from the objective of central authorities. Hence, Mafia used violence as an instrumental means 
of social control, and to penetrate public administration for private ends. Catanzaro concept resumes 
in the fact that Mafia did not rely on the past. Otherwise, it would have been impossible to adapt so 
quickly to the variable conditions of markets and administration. According to him, latifundium of 
west-central Sicily is atypical because build on an absentee class represented by landowners, the 
self-centred agrarian bourgeoisie, that are represented by Gabelloti, and the peasants that did not 
create a class of peasants owners. Thus, Mafia represented a response to the burden relationship 
among peasants and landlords, as well as between landlords and Gabelloti and between the latter 
and the central government. 
Lupo Salvatore (1993)
29
 criticised the latter hypothesis bringing evidences about the strong ability 
of different Mafia associations to organize and interact among them. Lupo analysed the revolts of 
1848, 1860 and 1866 in order to highlighted the strong relationships between public authorities and 
Mafia. Since 1848, the leaseholder on citrus groves of Monreale was Salvatore Miceli who was also 
squad chief among the leaseholder known as giardinieri. He was co-opt by Maniscalco into the 
Bourbon police. During the revolt of 1860 he was a rebel and went arrested as an accomplice of 
bandits but he was freed mysteriously by the questore Pinna.
30
 He died during the revolt of 1866. 
Through his analysis, Lupo demonstrated how the organizational nature of the associations was 
important for their activities since they had already established their influence into the police army. 
According to Lupo, it is the inclusion of bandits and member of small gangs into the police that 
favoured the establishment of Mafia. The organisational nature of Mafia are highlighted also in the 
Rapporto Sangiorgi, a report of the police commissioner of Palermo, Ermanno Sangiorgi written 
from 1898 to 1900. It is a very little-known and used document in the literature about the existence 
of criminal gangs whose members followed precise rules and were coordinated by bosses which 
generally are submitted to a superior member, a kind of “big boss”. Since his arrival, Sangiorgi 
started investigating about the committed crimes occurred in the Conca d'Oro. He highlighted that 
almost all districts of Palermo coexist with criminal associations acting as a unique cohesive one. 
They acted according to common decisions and an extended system of local control. Sangiorgi 
examined a citrus enterprise where four death bodies were found in a cave. He understood that the 
victims belonged to a Mafia organisation, and that they worked as guardians. In 1899 Francesco 
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Siino, chief of the Malaspina cosca, was caught and he did confess to Sangiorgi that eight families 
shared the control over the conca d'oro activities. Thanks his declaration, the chief of police was 
able to arrest lot of mafiosi and reported the repressive methods used to conquer conca d'oro. The 
main charges of Sangiorgi were extortion, political relationships and the organic behaviour of 
separate groups. “Among 218 mafiosi recorded in the report, 45 were paid workers as guardians and 
gardeners, 26 landowners, 25 mediator as traders and gabelloti, 27 peasants, 11 shepherds and 7 
cart drivers” (Lupo, 1993, pg. 82). This composition is taken as a clear evidence of the 
organizational importance for Mafia activities, which connected the landowner and traders, as well 
as the shepherds and peasants. 
2.2. Institutional-sociological determinants 
As already mentioned, Franchetti (1876) deals with the mafia phenomenon as an institutional issue, 
linked and derived from specific historical factors. He built the theoretical framework of the so 
called industry of violence, concept that will be reviewed by several scholars. More recently, 
Gambetta (1993), for instance, described the Mafia as an industry for protection instead of an 
industry of violence. Franchetti (1877, pg. 92-93) stated that: “la violenza privata non trova contro di 
sé che altre violenze private, e non incontra nella società alcuna forza collettiva diretta a combatterla. La 
sola che potrebbe trovarsi dinnanzi, sarebbe quella del Governo quando fosse realmente una forza”. The 
main reason for this specification by Gambetta is that violence is seen as a means and could not be 
a valuable object, while protection should better performed as a service taken value according to its 
extent. 
During XIX century, the use of violence was no more exclusively managed by the aristocrats and 
ruling class, but it started to be used also by former guardians and former soldiers for personal 
purposes. These groups were freed of the feudal commitment towards aristocrats and landowners, 
and they started illegal activities while they also provide their services to those able to afford them. 
Once a landowner had acquired protection for its properties, they indirectly addressed theft to other 
properties whose owners did not “buy” protection. The Bourbons government was not able to 
established ‘the monopoly of violence’, and Franchetti charged the national authorities deviations 
that used bandits and mafiosi for police purposes to be a tragic mistake by institutions. 
Consequently, social relationships were based on violence, that could bring advantages to every one 
able to use it. A typical example is the body of 'campieri a cavallo', a sort of rural police made by 
dishonest and violent people who were free to live without any military code. They were generally 
preferred to solve dispute related to cattle rustling or crop damages. 
These are evidence of how the ‘industry of protection’ took place, thanks to weak institutional 
framework, and were likely to transform into a social institution. An important institutional change 
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was the abolishment, with the law of 7 july in 1866 of the ecclesiastic corporations, and the law 
1867 for the liquidation sale of their assets. Franchetti reported that about 190000 hectares of 
ecclesiastic lands were given to perpetual lease, called enfiteusi, and “from 20300 lots, 20000 new 
landowners were created”31. Furthermore, a strong imposition of the military service, 7 years long, in 
a context of general distrust and rural economy, decreased the agricultural labour force The result of 
the strong military service was an increase in the number of brigands and mafiosi who preferred to 
join criminal gangs in order to avoid the departure. The long isolation of the Island with respect to 
continental Italy made the departure not easy to undergo, especially because there was not a 
national and civic-minded that could justify the military service. Their traditional strong family ties 
made them refuse to move far away from it. 
Damiani (1881) brought evidences of landlords living far from their fields, in particular thanks to 
the contract known as “gabella”, by which gabelloti, a new social class, substituted landowners 
controlling their lands and exploiting peasants in order to improve their gains. The gabella is a duty, 
originally created in the middle age. It was already presence during the feudalism but it was used 
increased significantly when landowners, after 1812, felt that external influences could threaten 
their well-being. From Cutrera (1900, pg. 72): “Basta dire ch'essi sono solamente liberi di fare soltanto 
quello che la mana loro permette”. However before 19
th
 century the landowners were absent too. In 
effect they lived in the castles or other properties leaving the campieri, as guardians of the estates. 
Even though violence was used, it was leaded by landlords and aristocrats until the feudal system 
abolishment. But with introduction of the Gabella contract, Gabelloti represent an harmful 
mediator between landowner and peasants
32
. The absence of monopoly of violence was exploited 
by gabelloti and, even if the majority of them lived in the urban centres, they were much more 
influential than campieri and landowners, who could even live very far from their properties (e.g. in 
Naples). Also the bad living condition of rural areas boosted an alienation between peasants and 
landowners. Among Gabelloti there were also former peasants but they should be richer than the 
average to pay first the gabella price plus all the costs for the first year of cultivation, hence no one 
among common folk had this possibility. In such a context, class divides increased and, clearly, 
peasants felt a general belief of personal violence and revenge as the best way to claim their own 
rights. 
Diego Gambetta (Gambetta, 1993), an Italian sociologist, analysing the emergence of the Sicilian 
phenomenon, refused the cultural hypothesis as the generating factor behind Mafia, and he defined 
Sicilian Mafia as an industry devoted to private protection. This business was based on protection, 
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considered as a valuable service. Gambetta criticized Franchetti because he focused on violence 
which instead, on his view, is a means and it should not be associated to a good or a service. 
Protection, rather than violence, could be economically valuable since there were protection supply 
and demand. In order to write his opus published in 1993, during 1986-87, Gambetta stayed in 
Palermo and examine the Mafia phenomenon analysing the documents of the Centre Giuseppe 
Impastato, collaborated with Umberto Santino and Anna Puglisi, as well as with the police official 
Saverio Montalbano and other people directly involved in fighting Mafia. Thus, his work is based 
on operational research done at the end of ‘80s. He made immediately clear the role of Mafia as a 
necessary mediator in those economic and social relationships undermined by a general lack of 
confidence, that is, the market in which Mafia operated is characterized by instability. It is 
important to underline the point of Gambetta, who specified that whatever kind of trade done within 
the community, either legal and illegal, protection was the element allowing to distinguish Mafia 
enterprises from a common one. Protection should not be explained only with the protection needed 
while shipping valuable goods, instead, it is intended as the guarantee offered by Mafia to weaken 
competition, to avoid losses or theft when trading, to avoid reprisal when cheating on somebody 
else. Thus he agreed with Franchetti in tracing back the mafia origins to the transitory period started 
from the abolishment of feudalism in Sicily, in 1812, until the establishment of a new democratic 
society in 1861. This event transform land into a kind of new good, subject to property rights. 
Meanwhile, as a result of the reforms, protection's demand boomed and Mafia represented the only 
trusty supplier able to face it. Since the abolishment of the feudal system at the beginning of XIX 
century, the Bourbons tried to establish a system of modern property rights while the public trust 
was almost inexistent, and the resulting lack of trust and of certainty of rights made rise the demand 
for private protection. This protection was typically supplied by those subjects trained to use 
violence, as former soldiers, vigilantes, private guards and bandits. Mafia was able to supply such a 
service especially where lands became more fragmented and where the public trust was very weak. 
To be a mediator and protector, reputation has fundamental meaning among population and it could 
be even more important than real protection itself. Generally, a well-known and feared family that 
took the control over some lands could potentially avoid to be physically present into the fields 
since its reputation is enough to generate the fear for future negative consequences. 
The historical episodes provide evidences that Mafia acted also as an extorter against entrepreneur 
as well as landowners, and it seemed more sounded that Mafia was acting at the same time both as 
an extorter and enforcer, depending on the economic advantages deriving from the alternative sides 
to be protected. Religious signs and sudden act of charity elevate themselves to a group attending to 
peasants conditions. Gambetta wrote that “lo spionaggio, la segretezza, la violenza e persino le 
devozioni religiose non ci appaiono più come codici culturali arcaici o manifestazioni accidentali, bensì 
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risorse necessarie al razionale commercio della protezione” (Gambetta, 1993, pp. 62). Her book made 
an important contribution since it analysed the public trust matter, giving rise to new hypothesis 
about the emergence of Mafia. She also explained the heterogeneous origins and development of 
Mafia in Sicily as a matter of geographical rigidity of the industry of protection and tried to trace 
back Mafia origins to the first appearance of the industry of private protection. In the eastern 
regions, new and old landowners were more unified during post-unification and for this reasons 
they were able to keep the control over the demand for protection. However she acknowledged that 
Mafia emerged neither from latifundium consequences alone, nor from rich trades and advanced the 
idea that together, urban and rural spheres, poor and rich classes, generated the pre-context for 
Mafia origins. 
Salvatore Lupo (1993) proposed similar arguments but he focused on different events. He brought 
the case of Notarbartolo murderer, in 1893, as the example of the first murder ordered by “the 
highest ranks of the Mafia hierarchy”33. Notarbartolo was the manager of Banco di Siclia and a 
politician. He worked together with Palizzolo which was a local councillor of Palermo and, later on, 
he became a deputy from 1882 to 1900. This murderer marked a huge change into the ruling class 
which realized how urgent was the phenomenon. Palizzolo was accused to be the mandatory of the 
crime. The following three trials against the charged were held far away from Sicily and 
nonetheless, Mafia affiliated tried to misdirect the investigations. The police inspector Di Blasi, 
“creatura di Palizzolo”, was arrested in the courtroom during the trial and also the questore of 
Palermo in 1893, Ballabio, was seemingly accused of complicity with Palizzolo. During the trial, 
the defence counsel admitted that Palizzolo had a huge network of “clientela”, part of which “are 
mafia members used, as other members of Parliament, during the elections”34. For Lupo, the origins of Mafia 
are to be found in the Italian unification, as a subset in this process of change. According to his 
view the huge difference between north and south is reflected into the opposite popular perception 
of the reforms. The northern population had a liberal mindset, whereas the southern considered the 
unification a takeover from foreign people. The effective consequences of such a takeover were 
tragic for peasants, damaged by new taxes that worsened their financial conditions and increasing 
their general discontent, thus, the financial aspect is also another point which was analysed in the 
literature. 
Not only sociologists and historians were influenced by the work of Gambetta, but economists too. 
Oriana Bandiera (Bandiera, 2003), for instance, tested Gambetta’s hypothesis through a demand-
supply model of protection dealing with data collected by Damiani’s inquiry in 1886. Following 
Gambetta’s path, Bandiera set up a model to test the “industry for protection hypothesis”. This was 
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one of the first attempt to define the emergence of Mafia using analytical tools typical for 
Mainstream Economics Theory. The tested hypothesis is that Mafia was more likely to emerge 
where the land were fragmented, particularly after the fall of the feudal system in Sicily, on 1812. 
The falling feudalism brought to a division of large lands, owned by the lords, into smaller ones and 
such a division left the room for the private protection because the police forces were not strong 
enough to keep control over huge lands. Moreover, landowners and workers did not use to live in 
the fields, leaving free Mafia member to easily threaten other landowners to destroy the crop 
cultivations, as well as to cut them off water supply when it was managed by local Mafia. I will 
deal with data and results of these research papers in the next chapter. 
2.3. Economic Determinants 
Franchetti (1876), defined the Mafia as an “industry of violence” and stated that, during periods of 
political and economic uncertainty, violence was much more used and extortion were often in 
practice. Mafia had a great number of clients and different enterprises of protection are likely to be 
connected among them, in order to maintain the control over economic activities. The main crimes 
were cattle-rustling, kidnapping and fields destruction as a terroristic acts which reinforced the 
violent reputation of the clients. Violence, physical or moral, was always present when mafiosi 
acted: for example, Mafia members were able to buy the fruits previously the effective harvest 
period thanks in order to sell it with high profit margins and causing economic losses for the 
landlords that were obliged to accept whatever proposal by Mafia members. According to Villari, 
the criminal phenomenon is more concentrated in rich areas as Palermo and Conca d'Oro. From 
(Villari,1878, pg. 28): “nella Conca d'Oro l'agricoltura prospera; la grande proprietà non esiste; il 
contadino è agiato, mafioso, e commette un gran numero di delitti.” 
The most important source on the agrarian conditions is provided by the inquiry of Damiani and 
Franchetti. The importance of this inquiry derives from being the agricultural activity the most 
important and relevant sector for the economic activity of the island. Damiani and Franchetti agree 
on the correlation between the presence of mafia in areas with more latifundium. Indeed, as mafia 
does not necessarily require infrastructures, the latifundium was the perfect spot to establish and 
expand because of the lack of police enforcement. In the latifundium, farmhouses lived and worked 
in awful conditions, without proper cattle shed and houses for farmers (Franchetti, 1876). Damiani 
(1881) highlighted the increasing social distance between the owner and the farmer with respect to 
the size of the property/field. This social distance is what make farmers “strangers” among them, 
reduced the reciprocity and the social relationships which are the basis for a unite community. The 
structure of the land property, that is the latifundium, is for Franchetti and Damiani, an important 
source of no confidence towards the public administration, and poverty among farmers. The reasons 
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are that day by day workers are not building connections with the owner or gabelloto, the absentee 
owners made the campieri and gabelloti able to exploit the peasant without improving any service 
to them e.g. no house were build close to the field. Mistrustful and poverty are two characteristics 
sparked the organization of criminal activity in order to improve personal living conditions. These 
conditions concern the majority of population living the hinterland, but there is a contrasting 
situation along the northern coastline, in particular, latifundium did not exist. However, this area is 
empirically characterized by a high presence of Mafia around Palermo, in that area known with the 
name of Conca d’Oro. Villari (1878), for instance, admitted to be unable to explain Mafia presence 
in this case since he had always associated the phenomenon to the poor economic conditions of 
society, whether there, peasants seemed to live in better conditions than elsewhere. Colajanni 
(Colajanni, 1885) tried to prove that the wellness of Conca d’Oro is just illusory, but unfortunately 
this was the case. For instance, Franchetti and Cutrera reported that less cases of Malaria were 
recorded in the western provinces than elsewhere. Furthermore, farmers of Conca d'Oro received a 
good remuneration and respectable salary. There are evidences about peasants able to afford 
valuable goods as clothes and precious accessories that were worn and shown during the non-
working days and the feast days. (Villari, 1878). Here, nutrition is better sustained than elsewhere 
since the slaughter of cattle and sheep is normally more than double with respect to an hinterland 
village. In this context, a strong value is given to the appearance and no matter whether the power 
and luxury arisen from the thefts, extortion or other criminal activity. The goal was to appear as an 
aristocrat or as a member of the bourgeoisie. During the working days, instead, peasants moved 
back to their fields and modestly dressed. These are the conditions characterizing Palermo and 
Conca d’Oro during 19th century and the manner in which Mafia developed in this area is through 
clientelism and the network among the guardians of the citrus crops. 
By moving towards the south, it is worth to note an area of the mining activity, in particular Sulphur 
extraction. In such a sector, from the relation of Damiani (1881), we know that 18.860 people were 
employed and they produced a high value good which was increasingly used in Europe at that time. 
The working conditions described by Sonnino, Damiani and Villari are really horrible and they 
brought sad evidences of children working in the same conditions of adults, and often they died or 
get seriously injured. For example, Villari (1878) describing the mining activity, denounced 
workers crippled by these activities and sometimes they lost their lives. Even if they receive higher 
revenues, this primitive work make them lose the idea of savings and the opportunity to enjoy them. 
In this context, workers gave very high value to physical resistance, bringing them to solve 
problems physically and often it ended up with a murderer. Love, religion and dignity were almost 
absent in this social context, hence, the level of trust within the community is very low and the 
relationships are often ruled by violence. This could well justify the positive presence of Mafia in 
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the mine area, in particular, the area of Girgenti. 
Further reasons from Cutrera (1900), that refused the idea of latifundium as generator of Mafia, are 
the difficult economic conditions of the Piedmont Government which had cumulated debts for 
previous wars. This brought to the division of religious corporations and, a particularly quick sale of 
those properties, made former landowners and richer peasants become the new owners of these 
estates. The consequence was a general deterioration of labourers conditions because the priest 
living in the ecclesiastic fiefs did provide food and provisions during poor crop seasons. For same 
reasons, meal tax, that is a bread tax, had serious consequences on popular perception of the new 
government. He (1900, pg. 96-98) advanced also economic reason in a strict sense, as the low salary 
of both, guardians in Conca d'oro and campieri in the hinterland. The firsts received a good 
remuneration in the form of participation to the harvest, while the salary was not so generous 
relatively to the value of citrus market and to the profits of landowners. The campieri of hinterlands 
received a low salary and normal good remuneration, and only the chief campiere could afford a 
discrete salary. These should justify the emergence of independent organisation trying to exploit 
both, the popular dissatisfaction, and the desire or landlords to maintain a social and economic 
control on peasants. 
 
Recent Scholars advanced different reasons for the emerge of Mafia, therefore they investigated 
different determinants in order to find correlation with Mafia early presence. 
I will fully explain their work and data in the following chapter. Anyway, I could introduced some 
of them as the research of Dimico, Isopi and Olsson
35
 which, want to relate the origins of Mafia to 
the valuable market for lemons. At the end of XIX century, citrus value increased drastically and the 
main supplier was Sicily which had the perfect climate conditions for this crop cultivation. The 
model showed the presence of mafia to be strongly related to the production of citrus fruits. 
Further interesting research were done by Buonanno, Durante, Prarolo and Vanin
36
 which 
investigated on the influence of Sulphur Mines on Mafia presence testing their hypothesis with 
data extract from both, Cutrera and Damiani inquiries. They made a combination of weak 
institutions and resource abundance to be conducive to the emergence of mafia-type organizations. 
 
Before undergoing with the Sicilian case, I report here a brief review about the literature regarding 
                                               
35Dimico A, Isopi A., Olsson O. - Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: The Market for Lemons. 2012 
36Buonanno,Durante, Prarolo, Vanin – Poor Instituions Rich Mines: Resources Curse And The Origin Of Sicilian 
Mafia 
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the emergence of Camorra and 'Ndragheta. 
Camorra, a brief revision of its origins 
The origins of camorra might have been too far and deeply intertwine with the Medieval and feudal 
passage. It is almost impossible to clearly define the years or the determinants for the emergence of 
this phenomenon. Moreover, the destruction of the Bourbon’s police documents makes the study of 
this phenomenon really complex. 
The term Camorra appeared for the first time in 1735 on an official royal circular that authorised the 
establishment of eight gambling houses in Naples, including ‘Camorra avantipalazzo’. (Behan, 
1996). Behan stated that “in this instance, the word is almost certainly an amalgamation of capo 
(boss) and the Neapolitan street game, the morra. Alternatively, it was the word used to describe the 
rake-off earned by camorristi from goods being delivered or transported around the city; in other 
words, it was a word used to describe extortion. (Behan, 1996, p. 10). 
Before the Italian unification, the word Camorra was used, to identify the phenomenon of Campania, 
but it had also applied to Sicily
37
 and Calabria; while, after the unification and the diffusion of the 
word Mafia, the latter is used to indicate those criminal organizations originally routed in Southern 
Italy. Nevertheless, the negative connotation of Camorra as we intend it, was officially defined later 
on, through the so-called Pica’s law. Its name comes from the deputy who signed it on the 15th 
August 1863, Giuseppe Pica. 
Behan (1996)
38
, as well as Monnier (1863) and Villari (1878), agreed to place the Camorra’s origin 
in a period oscillating between 1799 and 1820. The likely reasons could have been the failure of the 
Napoleonic Republic and the Bourbons trail to restore their dynasty, which led to a period 
characterised by a vacuum of power that allowed the emergence of Camorra. 
Further fundamental historical source arose from Marc Monnier (1863)
39
, a Swiss Professor of 
Comparative Literature that lived in Naples during his adolescence and during his writings about 
Camorra, between 1855 to 1865. He studied hundreds of Police documents and despite all the effort, 
he did not find any evidence of Camorra type organisation before 1820-1830s. 
For him, the central activity of Camorra was the organised extortion, bringing evidence that 
Camorra organisation acquired its rules and behaviour from the Naples’ prisons where a similar 
type of association established the rules and the exercise of extortion. 
The successive division of Naples into twelve quarters by the French administrative reform made 
easier the spread of particular procedure as the extortion. The dimensions of the quarters made 
easier the control over it, since it is smaller than the entire city and allowed an easier emergence of 
                                               
37See Pietro Callà Ulloa citation in Chapter 2 
38Behan, Tom “The Camorra” 1996. Routledge 
39Monnier, Marc, La camorra. Notizie storiche raccolte e documentate. 1863 Firenze, Barbera editore 
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organised groups using violence to “conquer” the quarters. Around 1830, those dynamics brought to 
the diffusion of codified norms, codes, and behaviours arisen in the prisons that had spread to the 
city. Organized groups started to control the gambling houses of the quarters, monitor the borders, 
the import/export operations in the harbour as well as in the stations. They used violence to extort 
money as it was done in the prisons. 
Monnier proposed a chronological division of Camorra activities according to the different 
accomplishments carried out. In particular, a first stage going from 1830 to 1859, with Ferdinando 
II, Camorra was the “hidden police”; during Francesco II, from 1859 to 1861, it composed the 
liberal conspiracy and during the Revolution it was the “official police”; the last stage goes from 
1861 to 1878, when Vittorio Emanuele II was the King of Italy. During this period Camorra moved 
into the opposition aiming no more to maintain the public order. 
The first stage was characterised by the so-called hidden police which means that Camorra pursue 
the public order as well as the public justice. The authority of Camorristi was recognized by the 
proletariat, and they were perceived, in resolving juridical conflicts, as less expensive and fairer 
than the official judges (Monnier, 1863, p. 137). 
During 1860, Liborio Romano became the police chief and, due to the instability of the Neapolitan 
period, he entrusted the management of the public order to the Camorristi. He exploits their 
organisation in order to simplify the entrance of Garibaldi into the city, as well as to facilitated the 
political passage from the Bourbons to the Savoia. Romano assigned the maintenance of public 
order to the Boss of Camorra, Salvatore De Crescenzo recognising its organizational ability “in virtù 
della sua organizzazione e del suo potere di controllo territoriale” (Bevilacqua, 1993, p.40). In exchange 
for this position, De Crescenzo obtained the total amnesty and after the arrival of Garibaldi, 
Camorra members dedicated to smuggling business, controlling both the nautical and land trade. 
This intense activity of Camorra entailed a huge decrease in the daily tariff collected by the customs 
duties until one day of December 1860, ninety Cammoristi were arrested and the charge collected 
thereafter immediately increased. The “commendatore” of the Italian Kingdom, Silvio Spaventa, 
tried to remove Camorra from the important position achieved arresting more than hundred 
Camorristi in a single stroke thanks to their numerous infringement of laws. His attempt to destroy 
Camorra was great but insufficient, since, the arrested members escaped from their prisons. Despite 
the lack of big bosses, Camorra exerted constantly its influence in the city. Losing its official power, 
it organised the opposition and the actions against the State, as the control over electoral outcomes. 
The opera of Monnier is somehow fundamental to take an overview on how the relationships 
between Camorra and institutions, and between Camorra and common social lifetime were, already 
at that time, intertwined. 
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Then, Pasquale Villari, named Senator of Italian Kingdom by king Umberto in 1884, sent a letter in 
1861 to a newspaper called “La Perseveranza” by which he denounced the problem of Camorra in 
Naples’ area. Later, he sent another letter to the newspaper “L’Opinione” with the same goal. From 
his analysis, it was clear that Camorra worked closely with the institutions and moreover, he shed 
some light on a central fact: evidence that camorra was able to benefit from the public affairs. The 
following sentences are the conclusions of one of his letter
40
 and a clear evidence of this subject 
matter: 
“Moltissime ordinanze municipali non possono qui attecchire, se non convengono agli 
interessi della camorra. Napoli comincia a ripulirsi dacché la camorra con i suoi 
appaltatori ne trae guadagno. Ed io, come vice-sindaco di , ho potuto obbligare 1157 
proprietari a restaurare ed imbiancare le loro case e le ville, che sono cinte di mura, 
dacché, senza che lo sapessi, la camorra locale ha diretto, di comune accordo col mio 
usciere, l'operazione”. 
 
‘Ndrangheta 
The same happened in Calabria where the word Camorra spread around 1885 because it was used 
both to pinpoint the extortion planned by the Calabrian “ndrine” (from Greek , “a man who does not 
bend”) corresponding to the Mafia family in Sicily, and the organized structure. The main sources to 
investigate the emergence of ‘Ndrangheta in Calabria are the verdicts of local public prosecutors, 
which indicate a first period of confusion in the denomination of the phenomenon until 1900 when 
the term ‘picciotteria’ was introduced for the first time. 
A useful historical evidence brought by Ciconte (2008)
41
, is helpful to shed some lights on the 
different areas interested by brigands and Mafia activities in Calabria. The evidence is showing 
Palmi, in the province of Reggio Calabria, as the first and solely city where some brigand activities 
were registered. This happened around 1809 and did not last for a long time. Note that this is the 
specific area that had shown to be the cradle of ‘Ndrangheta. It was more likely to recognize diverse 
areas with respect to the dominant phenomenon, that is, areas more prone to the banditry were 
generally distinct than areas dominated by a Mafia-type organization. In fact, in this period, bandits 
were very active and present around provinces of Cosenza and Catanzaro, where indeed, Mafia 
phenomena were not reported to be heavily present. 
There are sentences documenting the use, in Calabria, of terms different than Camorra or 
Picciotteria, as: ‘Onorata Società’ (Honourable Society) to indicate a mafia-like-organization, and 
‘Famiglia di Montalbano’ to indicate a Calabrian Mafia family originated in the area called ‘Gioia 
                                               
40Pasquale Villari, Lettere meridionali. Torino, Fratelli Bocca, 1878, p. 5 
41Ciconte, Enzo “'Nrangheta” Rubettino, 2008 
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Tauro’. Even referred to the same phenomena, the different use of words to describe a unique 
phenomenon is clear evidence of underestimation from the juridical point of view. 
At the very beginning, (Ciconte, 2008) the “ndrine” (the organisations, or the family groups) kept in 
touch each other’s but they missed a Big Boss leading all these groups. This situation last for long 
time since, the ‘Ndrangheta, as we know it nowadays, get born on 1991, just after the conclusion of 
the internal conflicts that brought to the alliance and the geographical division of the region. As for 
the Sicilian case, the word ‘Ndrangheta is originally used with a positive connotation, as underlined 
by Paolo Martino, Professor of Linguistics at the University of Rome, and only in the last two 
decades, the meaning became negative due to the influence of mass media and journalistic 
chronicles. 
‘Ndrangheta is the association that benefited the most from its low visibility, and moreover, it is 
more closely related to traditions, family values, and sacral symbol.
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Chapter 3 
Quantitative Indicators of Mafia concentration 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the main contributions coming from the economic literature. providing a 
quantitative assessment of the presence of Mafia. I have organized the studies following the 
previous structure for sociological-institutional and economical determinants. Hence, the different 
hypothesis advanced by the scholars, for Mafia estimation, are gathered in two groups, emphasising 
the possible quantitative indicators to estimates historical Mafia presence. At the end of the section I 
report also a modern measurement for current Mafia presence developed by Transcrime. The 
researches lied basically on early inquiries and studies of the phenomenon, namely, Damiani's 
inquiry (1881) and Cutrera (1900). The first and the second one are based on a personal collection 
of data by questioning town mayors, judges, magistrates and pretori about the general social 
conditions, land distribution, and productivity as well as local Mafia presence. The latter is more 
based on personal assessment and references to his police official experience. Eventually, he 
referred to Damiani (1881) with respect to the agricultural and geographical conditions since the 
latter one was among the first inquiry on the agrarian conditions of the Island. 
Before moving to the documents, giving the influence of these two first enquiries conducted at the 
end of the nineteen century that markedly affect the current economic research on mafia, I briefly 
introduce first the two main references that had historically tried to estimate Mafia presence in the 
Island. Already in 1900, Cutrera stated that numbers and quantitative measures were not appropriate 
to capture such a complex phenomenon. However, he presented at the end of his book, a detailed 
map of the distribution and intensity of Mafia. The following scholars who referred to him had used 
this map to list Mafia presence in 1900. Figure 1 above represent it. 
The second most used information are contained in Abele Damiani parliamentary inquiry started in 
1881 and ended in 1886. It is important to note that Buonanno et al. (2012) and Oriana Bandiera 
(2003), which we shall discuss later on, referred to the 'Summary Report done by Damiani to the 
Italian parliament' without using the original inquiry. Dimico et al. (2014), instead, referred to the 
original one. In the latter, there are all questionnaires that pretori replied to. Indeed, the inquiry was 
organized with a list of questions sent to local authorities according to the investigation. In 
particular, for what concern Damiani's inquiry on the agrarian conditions (crops, taxes, wages, land 
fragmentation and general relations between peasants and landlords), questionnaires were sent out 
to 357 mayors, receiving complete information for less than half. The second part of the inquiry was 
dedicated to social conditions of peasants. In this case, questionnaires were sent to 179 pretori, that 
are the lower court judges. To estimate the quantity of crime, questions referred to the form and the 
32 
33 
intensity of crime in each district. The questions direct to reduce the possibility of any 
misunderstandings, like “What is the most common form of crime in the town? Or What are their causes?”42 The 
replies ranged around several crimes as rustling, robbery and murders, but there were also specific 
questions addressed to explicitly take into account Mafia. Given that the term was already known at 
that time, it is unlikely that, talking about Mafia during that period, could have brought to 
misunderstandings. The real distortion arose when pretori in line with code of silence, wanted to 
hide some negative aspects related to their administrations. By the authors, I believe that it is almost 
impossible to recognize whether the replies are affected by fear of bad reputation, conspiracy 
reasons in agreement with the omertà values, or for alienation and unfamiliarity with Mafia 
activities, meaning a true independence between institutions and Mafia. Due to previous reasons 
and to the structure of the questions of the Inquiry, it is likely that some towns had a certain level of 
Mafia activity even though the pretore does not reckon it as the main source of crime. This problem 
may affect results. Slightly differences arose among scholars using data from the original inquiry, 
and those using data from the summary report of Damiani. Therefore, I would prefer to not report a 
unique map for Damiani, but I will do it for specific documents. 
 
3.1. Institutional-Sociological determinants 
The paper of Bandiera (2003)
43
 aims to assess whether and how the division of landholdings 
fostered the development of Mafia. She used a two stages game with two players to formalize the 
opinion that fragmented landholdings, rather than big estates, conveyed to the development of 
Mafia. At the first stage, identical landowners decide prize they are willing to pay to Mafia for each 
combination of protected/unprotected landowners. If the landowner is unprotected, he has got 100% 
of probability that its land will be stolen, while if he is protected, he has got a probability of its land 
being stolen inversely related to the number of landowners protected. Obviously, landowners wants 
to be the only protected one. They compete for protection as to avoid thefts. In the second stage, the 
Mafia decides the number of customers to serve to maximize its utility. In equilibrium, the increase 
in the number of landowners, lead to an increase in Mafia pay-off and, consequently affects Mafia 
activity. The crucial assumption is that existed negative externalities from the purchase of protection 
from a single landowner because it deflects crimes on other properties. Bandiera had shown that an 
increase in landowners, for a given extension of land, increased the competition for protection, thus 
raising the potential profits of the enforcer. This prediction is tested according to data of the 
parliamentary surveys. She predicted Mafia to emerge where land is fragmented among several 
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From Damiani inquiry 
43Bandiera, Oriana 2003.“Land Reform,The Market For Protection and The Origins Of The Sicilian Mafia: Theory, 
Evidences 
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owners and where land has higher valued crops than elsewhere. She tested these findings on a 
dataset compiled using data on 70 western towns based principally on the Damiani-Jacini’s 
parliamentary inquiry of 1881, in which are reported qualitative information about Sicilian land 
fragmentation and the intensity of Mafia in the same towns. Bandiera hypothesis is based on 
Gambetta (1993) proposition of Mafia as a protection agency, and Franchetti (1876) who consider 
land fragmentation and the diffused use of violence as possible reasons for Mafia development. 
Such an agency operated since the abolition of feudalism by supplying the protection to those 
private owners able to acquire it. In particular, there were several potential suppliers of protection, 
because, after the feudalism, all vigilantes, former soldiers, private guards, bandits, and prison 
inmates were free to abuse their force being no more at the exclusive service of landowners. An 
increasing number of potential customers arisen with the division of lands and the following 
reforms that increased Mafia profits related to protection. “Between 1812 and 1860 the number of large 
landowners increased from 2000 to 20,000”44. 
Data 
Since there are no data for profits, Bandiera used the Damiani’s inquiry for the presence of Mafia 
activity to test her predictions. 
From the Damiani inquiry (Damiani 1881) she coded Mafia activity from 0, corresponding to none, 
up to 3, for very strong Mafia activity. The second variable she coded was Land fragmentation, 
information used as a proxy for the number of landlords. This information were as well taken from 
the interviews with town mayors that establish if the land was concentrated into small, medium or 
large landholdings. Unfortunately, the subjective conception of small and medium extension of land 
made the author took frag=1 when the mayor reported that land was concentrated in small or 
medium holdings. A proxy for the need of protection (vines), since they are the more valuable crops 
than grain one, it is used as a proxy for land income. Therefore, a higher income equalled to higher 
protection. The differences in service quality are captured by a province dummies (provi), included 
in the regressions to control for different Governors administration and public security. 
Table 1 - Mafia Activity And Land Size 
Land distribution 
 
Mafia Activity 
Small or medium Large TOTAL 
None 22 (40%) 9 (60%) 31 (44.3%) 
Limited 5 (9%) 3(20%) 8 (11.4%) 
Medium 17 (31%) 3(20%) 20 (28.6%) 
Strong 11 (20%) 0 (0%) 11 (15.7%) 
TOTAL  55 (78.6%) 15 (21.4%) 70 (100%) 
                                               
44Bandiera, 2003, pg 8 
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* Descriptive statistics for the towns in the sample. 
It is worthy note how large landholdings do not show to be affected by Mafia activity, while, 20% 
of these lands have medium and limited Mafia activity. Another important fact is that, among towns 
with small or medium fiefs, 40% claimed that Mafia was not active. One possible explanation is 
that omertà affected pretori too, or rather, they would like to avoid local scandal about negative 
conditions of its properties and institutions. Hence, these results are possibly distorted. 
Table 2 – Estimates Of Mafia Activity 
Linear Regression with Robust Standard Errors (in parenthesis) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
LHS Variable: Mafia Mafia Mafia Mafia Mafiad 
Land 
fragmentation 
.71** 
(.26) 
.70** 
(.29) 
.59* 
(.30) 
.70** 
(.26) 
.29** 
(.13) 
vines   1.56 
(1.12) 
  
prov1  .22 
(.37) 
.33 
(.39) 
.22 
(.22) 
.06 
(.11) 
prov2  -.46 
(.38) 
-.49 
(.36) 
-.46 
(.25) 
-.35** 
(.09) 
prov3  -.45 
(.38) 
-.55 
(.38) 
-.45 
(.36) 
-.25 
(.17) 
Cluster 
(District) 
No No No Yes Yes 
R2 0.06 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.16, 
NOBS 70 70 70 70 70 
Columns (1) to (4): Dependent Variable Mafia, =0,1,2,3 if there is no Mafia activity if there is some Mafia activity if there is Mafia 
activity and if Mafia activity is very strong, respectively. Column (5) Mafiad=1 if Mafia>0, =0 otherwise. 
**Significant at the 5% level or better; *Significant at the 10% level or better. 
 
A reply to this paper is given by Pazzona (2010)
45
 who predicted that Mafia is more likely to 
emerge in a context of strong competition among new social actors, where private protection 
industry could establish its wicked influence on society. The purpose of the writer is to use a new 
measurement for Mafia activity and new variables and test whether social competition influenced 
Mafia presence positively. For him, Mafia emerged as “a manu military used by emerging classes 
in their fights for the lords' legacy at the end of feudalism”46. The idea related to private protection 
was acknowledged by him, whereas, Bandiera's insight about land fragmentation was not. Mafia 
activities are expected, by the author, to be related to high land income situated mainly in the 
countryside. The reasons for such an expectation are fecund opportunities for new social actors to 
capture the Lords' legacies in those market context showing increasing value. Land income is 
                                               
45Pazzona, Matteo. 2010 Emerging Classes And The Fight For Resources And Empirical Investigation Into The Origin 
Of Sicilian Mafia 
46Pazzona, 2010. pg. 2 
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related to crop value instead of specific land composition. The historical background considered is 
in general agreement with the discussed literature that associated Mafia emergence to post-feudal 
lack of control over violence and a general spread of its illegal use. Therefore, he related to the 
concept of weak institutions that leave room for private violence, leading to the emergence of 
banditry and Mafia. Moreover, he emphasized how the reforms, both pre and post-Unitarian Italy, 
did exclude peasants from the property distribution and political life for their poor economic 
conditions and low political educational skills. The evidence brought to this statement is the limited 
change in total land cultivated with cereals which proxy for big estates since it is a typical intensive 
crop. Table 3 “Referring to 160000 hectares of estates forcedly sold to creditors with the 1824 
law
47
 shows the following figures”48: 
 Sellers Buyers 
High nobility 93,5 58,3 
Low and rural nobility 5,3 13 
University 0,5 0 
Church 0,4 18,1 
Bourgeoisie 0,3 10,5 
Percentage of hectares sold and bought by different social actors after the 1824 laws. Source: 
Cancilla (1990) 
The argument about land fragmentation is that a rising bourgeoisie was able to exploit the reforms 
aimed to increase the number of small-scale landholdings, and consequently improved their power 
and their properties. Since the bourgeoisie became powerful as the dominant class, a middle class 
did not really emerge, apart for a minority composed of middle-small land owners, that existed 
before the feudalism fall. So the middle class was composed by these latter owner along with city 
traders, middlemen, and public administration employees. In this context, class competition related 
to land acquirement or rented through a gabella contract
49
, to guard and patrol citrus gardens or 
sulphur mine, gave huge weight on the relationships with Mafia and bandits. This gave raise to the 
so called, clientelism. Pazzona recognized that the eastern area was less implicated with such a 
framework. The scholars ascribed different factors, among which some economic differences 
between the two areas. In the eastern part, the land is more divided, and land property is also higher, 
whereas in the west, except for the coastal area or in the surroundings of the city, cereal cultivation 
dominated (Figure 2). Considering these evidences, Mafia did not emerge thanks to the presence of 
                                               
47“Nel 1824 la Sicilia ebbe una legge sua speciale che ordinò che tutti i beni dei baroni per pagare i loro debiti fossero 
venduti; e siccome non si potevano vendere per mancanza di compratori, allora fu detto che si facesse una 
assegnazione in beni fondi ai creditori per estinguere i loro crediti. I corpi morali erano creditori dei Baroni, cos' 
cstoro acquistarono ed ebbero assegnate una quantità non piccola di terre ovvero feudi”. Cited in Rendiconti del 
parlamento italiano discussioni del Senato del Regno. Sessione del 1861-62. 
48Pazzona (2010) pg.7 
49 See chapter 2 
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valuable markets but rather, as a consequence of middle classes competition. For instance, 
landowners were far more present on their fields in the east rather than the west and this putted the 
brakes to an extended diffusion of the gabella contract, so that the campieri had to do their work 
with no possibilities to pursue their own interest. 
Data 
He integrated data used by Bandiera, that is, Damiani dataset
50
, with the survey made by Bonfadini 
in 1876
51
. The latter is based on more than 1000 interrogations to local authorities, but 
unfortunately, there is a temporal gap between the two investigations. Another possible issue is 
given by measurement errors, intrinsic into the inquiry method. There are also missing observations 
in the data. However, the new set offered more information about Mafia than Damiani's one. 
Table 4 refers to Damiani's data. 
 Total number 
of towns 
Towns 
with data 
on Mafia 
3= a lot of 
Mafia 
activity 
2=Mafia 
is quite 
active 
1= little 
Mafia 
activity 
0= not 
Mafia 
activity 
Sicily 357 149 17 11 25 96 
4 Western 
provinces 
159 75 16 10 12 37 
3 Eastern 
provinces 
198 74 1 1 13 59 
By provinces 
TRAPANI  15 0 3 3 9 
GIRGENTI  16 7 4 3 2 
SIRACUSA  22 0 0 4 18 
MESSINA  25 0 0 5 20 
CALTANISSETT
A 
  16 3 1 6 6 
CATANIA  27 1 1 4 21 
PALERMO  28 6 2 0 20 
 
Table 5 is constructed by combining the Damiani and Bonfadini’s inquiries. 
 Total number 
of towns 
Towns 
with data 
on Mafia 
3= a lot of 
Mafia 
activity 
2=Mafia 
is quite 
active 
1= little 
Mafia 
activity 
0= not 
Mafia 
activity 
Sicily 357 160 48 8 25 79 
4 Western 
provinces 
159 86 47 7 8 24 
3 Eastern 
provinces 
198 74 1 1 17 55 
By provinces 
TRAPANI  15 9 0 0 6 
                                               
50Data(Damiani, Abele. 1881-1886.” Relazione del commissario Abele Damiani” in Atti della giunta per la inchiesta 
agraria e sulle condizioni della classe agricola, 1881-1886” XIII part 1 and 2, books from 1 to 5. Roma: Forzani e C. 
tipografia del Senato. 
51Borsani, Giuseppe and Bonfadini, Romualdo.1968. “L‟inchiesta sulle condizioni sociali ed economiche della 
Sicilia(1875-76)”. Cappelli, Bologna 
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GIRGENTI  22 14 4 2 2 
SIRACUSA  22 0 0 4 18 
MESSINA  24 0 0 5 19 
CALTANISSETT
A 
  16 4 1 6 5 
CATANIA  28 1 1 8 18 
PALERMO  33 20 2 0 11 
 
 
Mafia is likely to be more active for Bonfadini than Damiani, even though the set expanded for 11 
towns, the integrated information allowed to raise the estimated number of towns affected by strong 
Mafia activity. Important differences are observed among western provinces, in the specific case of 
towns coded with a high Mafia activity change from 16 to 47, and the corresponding towns showing 
no presence of Mafia activity decreased from 37 to 24. 
Figure 2 shows the geographical concentration of Mafia using a different database. Source: Pazzona (2010). 
On the left it is represented the data set based uniquely on Damiani, while, on the right there is the integrated 
dataset of both Damiani and Bonfadini inquiries. 
 
 
 
The first test was done using ordered probit estimation technique in order to find relationship 
between Mafia index and large properties. There are several missing observations among qualitative 
data, and potential measurement errors due to the subjective judgement of both, the questioned and 
the enquirer. Although these problems, the author found evidence of his theoretical conjecture with 
both, a probit and OLS. Table 6 
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 Regression is estimating the impact of large properties on the presence of Mafia for all Sicily. 
 Mafia Index 
3 
Mafia Index 
0 
OLS Probit Mafia Index 
3-Cereals 
Large 
Properties 
.120*** 
(.043) 
-.123*** 
(.041) 
.315* 
(.171) 
.205** 
(.0856) 
 
Cereals     .029 
 (.066) 
Dummy 
Catania 
.196** 
(.097) 
-.196** 
(.090) 
.361** 
(.138) 
.328* 
 (.180) 
.134 
(.087) 
Dummy 
Trapani 
.509*** 
(.134) 
-.461*** 
(.077) 
1.675*** 
(.480) 
.463*** 
(.136) 
.459*** 
(.153) 
Dummy 
Girgenti 
.653*** 
(.064) 
-.543*** 
(.036) 
2.257*** 
(.149) 
.618*** 
(.065) 
.613*** 
(.064) 
Dummy 
Messina 
.128 
(.124) 
-.129 
(.116) 
.135 
(.157) 
.217 
(.230) 
.0336 
(.124) 
Dummy 
Palermo 
.547*** 
(.097) 
-.532*** 
(.060) 
1.804*** 
(.178) 
.528*** 
(.133) 
.498*** 
(.097) 
Dummy 
Caltanissetta 
.356*** 
(.110) 
-.340*** 
(.084) 
.859** 
(.338) 
.442*** 
(.125) 
.339*** 
(.112) 
Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2   .424   
Observations 136 136 136 136 159 
 
When regressing the presence of Mafia on large properties, for the four western provinces, the 
coefficient is greater than the previous case. The findings that Mafia presence is positively linked to 
both, large estates and profitable land, is in accordance with the concept of Mafia as a protection 
agency. The last table referred to the estimation of the impact of all variables on the presence of 
Mafia for the four western provinces. 
Table 7 
 Mafia 
Index 3 
 
Mafia 
Index 
0 
OLS Probit 
cereals 
OLS 
Cereals 
Mafia 
Index 3-
Cereals 
Large 
Properties 
.122** 
(0.054) 
-.097** 
 (.038) 
.391 
(.256) 
   
Cereals    1.131*** 
(.295) 
2.657** 
(.921) 
.925*** 
(.231) 
Rich 
Agriculture 
.732*** 
 (.146) 
-.624*** 
(.157) 
2.09*** 
(.627) 
1.771*** 
(.446) 
4.505*** 
(1.131) 
1.584***(.2
83) 
Density of 
population 
-.063*** 
(.014) 
.054*** 
(.011) 
-.184*** 
(.053) 
-.095*** 
(.016) 
-.148** 
(.065) 
-.048*** 
(.014) 
Little 
influence of 
reforms 
-.227*** 
(.084) 
.226** 
(.098) 
-.621 
(.468) 
-.089 
(.119) 
-.621** 
(.423) 
-.245*** 
(.076) 
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Few 
peasants 
land 
ownership 
.191*** 
 (.059) 
-.143*** 
(.041) 
.561 
(.319) 
155 
(.133) 
.693** 
(.299) 
.235*** 
(.052) 
Dummy 
Trapani 
.099 
(.127) 
-.081 
 (.096) 
.482** 
(.702) 
-.055 
(.406) 
.279 
(.690) 
.044 
(.139) 
Dummy 
Girgenti 
.338*** 
(.086) 
-.262*** 
(.045) 
1.377 
(.547) 
.406*** 
(.060) 
1.338** 
(.564) 
.330*** 
(.092) 
Dummy 
Palermo 
.168* 
(.099) 
-.139** 
(.069) 
.683 
(.582) 
.101 
(.071) 
.798 
(.474) 
.214*** 
(.080) 
Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation
s 
70 70 70 70 70 70 
 
Few peasants' land ownership is a dummy variable, taking value 1 whether in the councils there 
were none or very few owners of the land. This variable could be considered as a proxy for land 
fragmentation and, by considering the marginal effect of this dummy for Mafia index, it is an 
evidence of Mafia being most likely to be active when lands are not fragmented. Cereals, instead, is 
a proxy used for latifundium since it was the typical large estate cultivation. In order to explain the 
irregular geographic distribution of Mafia in Sicily, Pazzona compared Sicily with Sardenia during 
the post-feudalism period. There are several similarities between the two islands as, for instance, the 
financial difficulty of peasants, historical domination of Spanish crown and a particularly high rate 
of violence and banditry
52
. The main difference is population density which was lower than in 
Sicily
53
. Low density brought to less competition for resources, and landowners were more present 
on their lands than Sicilian aristocrats who stayed in the city of Palermo or Naples. Furthermore, the 
importance of sheep breeding in Sardinia induce less developed cooperative and associations, which 
Scholar doesn’t claim to be directly connected to Mafia activity, but it is a good index for self-
organization and interest sharing. These are the arguments advanced to explain the differences with 
Sardinia. 
This paper analysed Mafia origins with slightly different data from those used by Bandiera. 
However, it yielded opposite results on the role of land fragmentation on Mafia emergence. Hence, 
the final point is more similar to the ones of Lupo and Pezzino; that emphasized the role of the 
bourgeoisie in exploiting the difficult context and were strongly organized, than the point of 
Franchetti and Gambetta based on the need for protection. Hence, Pazzona claimed that Mafia 
emerged mainly because of a the lack of middle class that is fundamental in a process of social and 
administrative transformation. This is in contrast with the theory of Bandiera (2003) which ascribe 
Mafia origins to a government lack of monopolistic control over violence that guarantee the 
                                               
52Lei-Spano, Gio Maria. 1975. “La questione sarda : con dati originali” Sassari : Libreria editrice Dessi. 
53Coda, Luisa. 1977. “La Sardegna nella crisi di fine secolo : aspetti dell'economia e della societa' sarda nell'ultimo 
ventennio dell'Ottocento” .Sassari : Editrice Libreria Dessi'. 
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enforcement of property rights. This fact had dramatic consequences on landowners not able to 
control their fiefs or garden since no official police was able to avoid thefts or extortion, it gave rise 
to the industry for protection. 
 
Buonanno, Prarolo, Vanin's
54
 paper of 2014 aimed to show empirically that Mafia and politicians 
have strong and constant relationships. Evidence about the strict interaction between Mafia 
members and politicians was the arrest in 1984 and the subsequent sentence for Associazione 
mafiosa and corruption. The sentence was 8 years in prison, whereas Giulio Andreotti, National 
Prime Minister for several times, was not condemned due to prescription but the court had 
established his stable relationships with Mafia members. Ciancimino was a member of the Christian 
Democrats party, and this is the party historically related to Mafia. After the revelation of the justice 
collaborator, Antonino Giuffrè, that claimed Forza Italia party to be supported by the Mafia, the 
authors of this paper wanted to estimate such a relation using data on the present diffusion of Mafia, 
that is, the number and location of properties seized by the authorities for Mafia reasons. 
For the presence of Mafia in Sicilian municipalities, the authors used both historical and 
contemporary data in order to avoid endogeneity problems. The former are based on Cutrera (1900) 
which assessed Mafia, at a municipal level, according to a four-point scale representing Mafia 
intensity from any to high. Cutrera's dataset will be discussed in the next section of this chapter in 
describing a different research paper of Buonanno et al. (2012). More recent data relied on a 
military police report of 1987 which indicated, at a municipal level, Mafia concentration based on 
the presence of Mafia families on a given territory. This dataset appeared to be correlated with 
dummy based on Cutrera’s data by 0,33 which is not negligible, especially with a century lag. 
Indeed, the first Scholar that used this report was Gambetta (1993, pg. 82) in order to look at the 
evolution of Mafia between XIX and XX centuries. Although this dataset had never been used for 
empirical investigations, it reports 80 municipalities plagued by Mafia presence. The following map, 
give us a better picture of this 1987 data. 
Mafia presence according to 1987 report of Carabinieri. Blue coloured municipalities indicate the 
presence of Mafia, not its intensity. Figure 3 
                                               
54Buonanno, Prarolo, Vanin - Organized Crime and Electoral Outcomes. Evidence From Sicily at the Turn of the XX 
Century - 2014 
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In order to complete the dataset with contemporary measures of Mafia, they took into consideration 
the number of firms and real estate properties seized by Italian judicial authority for Mafia 
involvement from agenzia del demanio, that is a State-owned-property agency. This is useful to 
assess the present activity of Mafia in the Island. Finally, they found that Forza Italia’s vote shares 
are positively and significantly correlated with Mafia’s presence in 1987, but not in 1900, whereas 
votes to the centre-left are unrelated to both. Contemporary Mafia presence is instrumented by three 
determinants of its early diffusion in the late XIX century: i) the presence of sulphur caves; ii) 
difference in elevation within a municipality; iii) agro-ecological suitability for cereals. Through an 
OLS technique it was estimated the correlation between the share of votes for Forza Italia and 
Mafia presence, and then add province-fixed effect and the set of the control variable. The results 
highlighted the positive association between Mafia and the share of votes obtained by Forza Italia. 
In particular, the findings suggested that Silvio Berlusconi’s party, Forza Italia, obtained more votes 
from municipalities plagued by Mafia. The author claimed that this correlation reflected the specific 
choice by Mafia families to sustain Forza Italia in exchange for more favourable policies. The 
reason for such a claim is that if citizens’ votes are controlled by the Mafia through violence and 
then sold to lenient politicians, the latter is unlikely to fight Mafia’s activities. 
Table 8 represented OLS estimation using historical measures of Mafia 
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3.2. Economical determinants 
Buonanno,Durante, Prarolo, Vanin's
55
 work of 2012 was based on the fact that one of the first 
documented Mafia-type criminal organization is the so-called Favara-brotherhood, discovered to be 
operating in Sulphur area surrounding Agrigento and Caltanissetta. Buonanno et al. (2012) indeed, 
documented the existence of a causal link from sulphur availability to Mafia’s emergence in Sicilian 
municipalities and they did so by building a dataset based on the assessments of Cutrera (1900). 
The paper integrates the empirical studies of Bandiera (2003) and Pazzona (2010) on the historical 
emergence of the Sicilian Mafia. It focused on Mafia as a provider of private protection, in 
accordance with the idea of Bandiera, but it aimed to find the economic origins of the phenomenon, 
in particular, how the significance of protection services was related to crop market value. 
Furthermore, the studies of Bandiera and Pazzona are limited to the west of Sicily, while Buonanno 
et al.(2011) expanded the data-set to the whole island through Cutrera's hint. For them, Sicilian 
Mafia is a combination of both, natural resources abundance, and weak institutions. Related to the 
                                               
55Buonanno,Durante, Prarolo, Vanin - Poor Instituions Rich Mines: Resources Curse And The Origin Of Sicilian Mafia. 
44 
studies of Skaperdas (2002)
56
 and Collier and Hoeffler (2002)
57
, the authors explain the first factor 
to be a “resource curse” because of weak institutions that leave room for the illegal use of violence, 
predatory attacks, and exploitation of natural resources. Since it is perceived as a protection 
provider, Mafia, could by far entered those markets that had shown a soaring value with respect to 
other ones. At that time, sulphur and citrus fruits were the most valuable commodities. Sicily 
accounted for up to 83 % of world sulphur production in 1893 (Squarzina, 1976), mainly because 
local mines were relatively superficial and this allowed the island became the main supplier for 
industrialized Europe. In 1855, over 70% of Sicilian sulphur was exported to France and Great 
Britain
58
. Meanwhile, demand for protection boomed especially because the product had to be 
transported to Palermo and therefore, it had to be protected from potential robbery. Citrus crops 
demand increased substantially too during XIX century, allowing for huge shipment of citrus 
towards the USA. For Dickie (2004) “in 1834, over 400,000 cases of lemons were exported. By 
1850, it was 750,000. In the mid-1880s, an astonishing 2.5 million cases of Italian citrus fruit 
arrived in New York every year, most of them from Palermo”. 
Even though the authors aimed to show that Mafia activity increased along with the growing 
importance of sulphur and citrus fruit markets, unfortunately, they did not find neither empirical nor 
historical support for the claim that the presence of citrus cultivation should causally provoke Mafia 
emergence. Instead, results suggested that Mafia activity was strictly related to sulphur extraction in 
the surrounding area of Girgenti. 
The focus of the analysis is the emergence of the Mafia, but in the last part of the paper, the authors 
document the existence of a strong correlation between the historical and current presence of the 
Mafia and discuss the possibility of using sulphur availability as an instrument for the latter. 
Data 
The tests were done using mainly historical data of the Mafia presence in Sicilian municipalities 
and about sulphur availability towards the end of XIX century. They used data from the book of 
Cutrera (1900) in which he collected detailed information on the intensity of the activity, and he 
completed a Sicilian cartography with a four-scale-point indicator of Mafia presence for 282 
municipalities. He also integrated information from Damiani (1881) about land productivity. 
Moreover, the Damiani's inquiry is the second source for early Mafia presence. It contains 
qualitative information about 158 Sicilian districts, called mandments. Data from Cutrera are 
believed to be less affected from subjective judgement and forceful because described the situation 
of almost 80% of total Sicilian municipalities. Nevertheless, Damiani data are used for robustness 
                                               
56Skaperdas, S., “The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not.” Economics 
of Governance, 2001, 2 (3), 173–202. cited in Buonanno et al.(2011) 
57Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke. 2002. Greed and grievance in civil war. Washington, DC: World Bank 
58Squarzina, Federico, Produzione e Commercio dello Zolfo in Sicilia nel Secolo XIX, Industria Libraria Tipograca 
Editrice, Torino, 1963. 
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test of their findings. They indicated with maf_c and maf_d the different dependent variables, 
indexes based respectively on Cutrera and Damiani. The results are similar to those obtained using 
Cutrera report. 
Figure 4: Geographic distribution of the Sicilian Mafia in the late XIX century. 
 
 
Instead the data for the presence of sulphur during 1886 are given by Squarzina (1963) and 
represented in the following figure.(Figure 5) 
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The dataset used for this study arose from the combination of early Mafia measurements across 
Sicilian municipalities, that is Damiani (1881) and Bonfadini (1876), with detailed information on 
natural resource endowments and a set of other geographical characteristics that could influence and 
explain Mafia presence. 
Data on land suitability, for the cultivation of citrus and other widespread crop categories such as 
cereals and olives, are taken from the IIASA-FAO Global Agro-Ecological Zones project (GAEZ)
59
. 
In order to test the hypothesis linking citrus cultivation to Mafia presence, data were taken from 
Damiani. This crop is present also in the eastern areas of the island. Therefore, there should be 
different explanations behind the irregular distribution of Mafia. Buonanno et al. concentrated on 
the presence of superficial water and underground basins
60
 because Mafia could better control 
superficial water that is less present in the east than the west. 
They also assessed Mafia to be positively and significantly correlated to terrain ruggedness, which 
complicated legal state enforcement since it offered hiding possibilities to Mafiosi. A further factor 
                                               
59FAO-GAEZ project can be found at http://www.gaez.iiasa.ac.at/ 
60Data from the Sicilian Waters Observatory 
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is that ruggedness is related to the protection demand for cattle during transhumance periods. 
Another set of control is given by postal roads, derived by the author from Cary (1799), river 
distance and port distance. These variables controlled for the commercial integration with the large 
cities, the harbour and the supply of water. Density
61
 is controlled to account for the fact that crime 
incidence might be higher in more densely populated areas. Land fragmentation, following 
Bandiera, is taken from the Damiani's inquiry and data are available at the municipal level, and it 
restricted the sample from 285 to 237. Fragmentation is a dummy taking value zero when large 
landholding is present. 
According to Bentley (1987), both population density and ruggedness are predictors of land 
fragmentation, so that the findings of Bandiera (2003) indicating land fragmentation as a 
determinant of Mafia activity could, perhaps, simply reflected the omission of these variables. 
Damiani-Jacini contains agricultural-related information for Sicilian municipalities and further 
information about the intensity of Mafia activity in 158 Sicilian districts (“emendamenti”). 
They reported OLS estimates of Mafia measures on a number of sulphur mines, at the municipal 
level, in 1886. The results are described for both, the dataset of Cutrera (maf_c), and the one of the 
Damiani-Jacini (maf_d). 
The results have shown that sulphur is always positively and significantly related to Mafia density.  
By replicating the analysis and regressing maf_d on sulphur instead of maf_c, the results are again 
strongly and positively correlate. In both cases, the results do not support the diverse arguments of 
Bandiera and Pazzona respectively. However, the latter relied on a different dataset based on 
Bonfadini inquiry as an extension for Damiani one. 
In order to test the persistence of Mafia activity, and hence to analyse if the incidence of Mafia 
activities today is correlated with its presence in XIX century, the authors indexed present Mafia 
activity through several variables: 
dissolution of municipal administration due to Mafia infiltrations; 
seized firms and 
seized real estate properties. 
Council is a dummy that takes value one whether the municipality council dissolved due to Mafia 
infiltration over the period 1991 to 2011 (Ministero dell'Interno), 
Real estates is a dummy equals to one whether at least one real estate property has been seized by 
the Italian judicial authority and Firms is a dummy equals to 1 whether at least a firm has been 
seized (source: Agenzia del Demanio). 
The estimates show a strong effect of early Mafia on the actual presence of Mafia, confirming the 
persistence of the phenomenon over time. 
                                               
61From 1861 census. Palermo, population of 185,000 inhabitants and a density of 1,000 inhabitants per squared km. 
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Results 
The results are indicated in the following tables. The first one refers to maf_c as the dependent 
variable while the second one included sulphur dummy. 
The following regressions, described the district level estimates of Mafia, accounting on data from 
the opera of Damiani while the fourth one describes the test for citrus. Since now, sulphur had well 
performed the explanation of Mafia presence, excepted citrus fruit that did not. The estimation test 
over citrus fruits is reported, following the table, on both, maf_c and maf_d. Unfortunately, the 
results exhibited no significant correlation among maf_c, maf_d and citrus dummies. 
The last table, instead, reported the test for Mafia persistence by regressing maf_c on the 
characterising feature of present evaluation of Mafia mentioned above, as municipal dissolution, 
seized firms and real estates. These results are significant in explaining the persistence of Mafia. 
Indeed, early Mafia is consistent with a current measurement of Mafia. 
Table 9 and 10 
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Dimico, Isopi, Olsson
62
 is the last paper research here reported and it has focused on production of 
citrus fruits. Since the first document by Franchetti (1876), Mafia emergence was associated with 
citrus fruits production in areas such as La Conca d'oro. The reasons for this explanation laid on 
some factors typical of this production crop. First, it is a valuable good, and especially at the end of 
XIX century, it became far more valuable than extensive crops as cereals one. The reasons for this is 
                                               
62Dimico, Isopi, Olsson – Market For Lemons - 2012 
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ascribed by the author to James Lind's discovery about the potentiality of citrus fruits to cure scurvy, 
a very common disease
63
. However, it was easy to damage a citrus garden since the plants, once 
ruined, will take years to recover, therefore, in a context of violence and threats, that one addressed 
or advanced against citrus producers are the most feared, and, for this reason, are likely to invoke 
Mafia's protection. More precisely, citrus crop involves barrier to entry given by fixed costs due to 
its slow growth and particular geographic limitation, since it needs a regular climate and specific 
soil suitability. Holding the presence of other types of production constant, the authors proposal was 
that prevalent lemon production in a town, with respect to other crops, should be positively 
correlated with the Mafia activity estimates. The combination of a sudden increase in citrus fruits, 
its imperfect market and potentially high profits along with weak institutions and local poverty 
should have represented a florid opportunity for the development of Mafia. 
Data 
Data at the town and district level are collected from the original Damiani inquiry (1881) which is 
part of a national inquiry approved in 1877 and proposed by Jacini. The subject of the investigation 
was the conditions of the agricultural sector and of the peasantry in every region of Italy. As already 
discussed, the difference with Bandiera (2003) and Buonanno et al. (2012) is that they used the 
original inquiry of Damiani. An exception was given by the town of Caltanissetta, whose data were 
collected from the Damiani's summary report
64
. Other differences are present in the estimated 
econometric model, for example, Dimico proxied citrus with historical data about export while 
Buonanno did it according to a measure of crop suitability for citrus, but Dimico explained that 
reverse causality is not likely to be potentially disturbing since the demand shock had exogenous 
origins. Few times, the authors extracted data from Di Vita (1906)
65
 when data over lemon 
relevancy were ambiguous. The authors divided Sicily into two parts: one composed by provinces 
of Palermo, Agrigento, Caltanissetta, and Trapani; the other composed of the remaining provinces. 
In the empirical investigation, they do not have data on profits from various types of production, but 
there are data on the presence of sectors in each town. Data about lemon exports are taken from 
Powell (1909)
66
. 
Figure 6 represents their estimates: Mafia and non-mafia towns in Sicily in the 1880s (Damiani sample) 
                                               
63http://www.wired.it/scienza/lab/2014/04/04/scoperta-vitamina-c/ 
64Seemingly, the documents refering to Caltanissetta had never arrived to Rome, where all folders were collected before 
the approval. Luckily Damiani had sources to fulfill the inquiry over the whole territory 
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Di Vita, Giuseppe, 1906. Dizionario Geogra.co dei Comuni della Sicilia e delle Frazioni Comunali: Con Notizie 
Storiche, F. Pravatà. 
66Powell, Harold G., 1909. Italian Lemons and Their By-Products, Bulletin No. 160, Bureau of Plant Industry, US 
Department of Agriculture. 
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The dependent variable in the model is Mafia; that represents a response variable that drives the 
probability of Mafia in each town of every province. If it is higher than zero, than the town i is 
positively associated with Mafia. The main explanatory variable is profits from citrus production
67
, 
while, the second group wanted to control for political status of each town, relating to the 
effectiveness of those policies pointed to increase small-scale ownership. The first set of the 
independent variable is given by Citrus, Wheat, Olives, Grape, and Sulphur
68
. All variables are 
binary dummies. The mayors that provided information about effective fragmentation did so 
according to three types of policies: allocation of land to smallholders after the fall of the feudal 
system; enfiteusi
69
 and the seizure of church-ruled territories. The dummy for fractionalization is 
positive when mayors reported the effectiveness of the cited policies. The third explanatory variable 
is related to the distribution of land and length of tenancy
70
. 
Mafia is a binary dummy variable for whether the pretore of the town reckoned Mafia as the most 
important source of crime in the town. 36% of the towns considered are strongly affected by Mafia, 
which means that almost 44 out of the 127 towns in our sample had Mafia listed as the most 
                                               
67Powell (1909), Powell, Harold G., 1909. Italian Lemons and Their By-Products, Bulletin No. 160, Bureau of Plant 
Industry, US Department of Agriculture. 
68
Data from Damiani inquiry. Using of dummy variables coded one in case the town is a dominant producer of these 
crops. 
69Enfiteusi, a perpetual lease that allowed farmers to use the land as if they were owners. “emphyteusis” 
70From Damiani (1881) except few cases De Vita (1906) 
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common form of crime
71
. 
I reported the table results for Mafia probit model. 
                                               
71Data on Mafia is available for 162 cities but when merged independent variables the sample covers 127 cities. 
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The model has shown that the presence of Mafia is strongly related to the production of citrus fruits 
using both, Damiani and Cutrera datasets. The latter was used for robustness check. Thus, the model 
predicts contrasting findings with Buonanno et al.(2012) who found Mafia to be related to sulphur 
production and not to citrus one. 
55 
A brief resume 
Oriana Bandiera has constructed a model with negative externalities arising when a landowner 
acquire protection by the Mafia. This externalities is due to the defection of theft towards other 
properties. She had based the idea that the monopoly over violence was voluntarily transferred to 
mafia even if Mafia had consequently exploited the acquired reputation to threaten others and 
extracted rents via extortion. Mafia had increasing profits in the number of owners that compete for 
protection. She have founded that the more fragmented land is significantly correlated to a higher 
presence of Mafia. Her paper is based on Franchetti (1876) and Gambetta's (1994) assumptions. 
The Data came from 1881 Parliamentary survey with qualitative information on mafia activity and 
land fragmentation in 70 towns in western Sicily. This inquiry contained information about the 
presence and intensity of Mafia groups, their intensity, the number of landlords (proxy for small-
medium or large landholdings); vines (proxy for more valuable crops). She founded that western 
areas were more affected by Mafia since lands are more fragmented and the crops value were higher 
than elsewhere. 
The second paper research is the one of Pazzona which followed Lupo (2004) and Pezzino (1989). 
He sustained that, after the demise of feudalism, the competition among social actors was sustained 
and especially in the hinterland the lords were losing much of their powers and spaces. He 
integrated the Damiani's inquiry with the one of Bonfadini (1876) and he was able to extend the 
dataset previously used by Bandiera, covering also some eastern towns and findings opposite result 
for what concern the fragmentation of land. In fact Mafia is more likely to be present where there 
are large properties and where land income is high. Data are based on Damiani for the land 
ownership, on the Minister of Agriculture, Industry and Business in order to have information about 
cereals, typically an extensive cultivated crop. The same thing for rich agriculture. 
The third paper examined the relationship between Mafia and politics, especially basing its attention on 
the political party of Silvio Berlusconi, Forza Italia and it claimed that his party have obtained higher 
vote shares in municipalities affected by Mafia. The data are based on Cutrera (1900) for the historical 
Mafia presence, on a 1987 military report for estimate current Mafia presence. The data for sulphur 
mines were taken by Squarzina (1963), while the data for Suitability of soil for cultivation of cereals are 
given by FAO_GAEZ, together with differences in altitude given by ISTAT for ruggedness 
measurement of land. This was done since a town with high difference in altitude is more likely to be a 
good hiding place for fugitives and it is more prone to suffer cattle rustling. His findings suggested that 
Forza Italia party obtained more votes in municipalities plagued by Mafia. His idea is that such a  
correlation reflects the specific choice by mafia families to sustain Forza Italia in exchange for more 
favourable policies. 
Buonanno, Durante, Prarolo and Vanin have instead focused on the rich endowment given by sulphur 
mines in order to explain Mafia emergence. He focused also on the role played by citrus fruits and their 
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increasing value but without he found no significance on this aspect. He found instead strong support to 
his hypothesis made on sulphur industry. He used data from Cutrera (1900) and Squarzina (1963) 
respectively for Mafia presence and Sulphur mines distribution. He constructed a dummy from Cary 
(1799) for ‘roads’ that proxies for ‘distance’ from Palermo; population data ‘pop’ from Marzolla census 
(1853) and population density ‘density’ using today municipal extension. For robustness check he relied 
on the dataset of Damiani (1881). 
The last research by Dimico et al. (2012) was based on the idea that high value crops were correlated to 
Mafia development and expansion. His model assumed that the citrus crop sector is characterised by 
initial costs and barriers to entry, for both climatic reasons and long time necessary to get first revenues. 
Hence the hypotheses is that Mafia was able to protect this sector and gain part of their huge profits. 
Based on the original Damiani Inquiry, more than a third of the towns were strongly affected by Mafia, 
and Messina and Siracusa are among the less impacted. Using this data, the model shown that the 
presence of Mafia is strongly related to citrus fruits production. 
 
Data and analyses from non-academic studies 
Apart from the distinction among different research, there are several recent studies, undertaken by 
Transcrime, in order to estimates the activities revenues, the presence and intensity of Mafia 
organizations. In order to comprehend the most recent evolution of the phenomenon, I show the 
analysis of the investments of Italian Mafia groups
72
. This study was done by Transcrime
73
, also 
referred to Camorra, 'Ndrangheta and Apulian organized crime. Others minor groups are included, 
e.g. Stidda and Basilischi. Indeed, it had focused on all the available information about good 
confiscated. 
The Mafia Presence Index (MPI) is a measure designed at the municipal level and based on several 
factors. The related data were asked to the Investigative Anti-Mafia Supervision (DIA), the National 
Anti-Mafia Department (DNA), to the Servizio analisi Criminale (SDI) managed by Minister of 
Interior, to the Agenzia Nazionale per l'amministrazione e la destinazione dei beni sequestrati e 
confiscati alla criminalità organizzata (ANBSC) 
The data referred to: 
i) murders and attempted assassination, 2004 to 2011, SDI; 
ii) people accused for Mafia association, 2004-2011, SDI; (that is, based on art. 416-bis) 
iii) municipalities and public administration dissolved for Mafia presence, infiltrazione Mafiosa; 
2000-2012 (August), Minister of the interior; 
                                               
72Progetto Pon Sicurezza 2007-2013 “Gli Investimenti Delle Mafie”,,Transcrime. 
73Transcrime is a Joint Research Centre on Transnational Crime of the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore of Milan 
and the University of Trento. 
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iv) seized assets of criminal organisation,
74
 2000-2011ANBSC and State-owned property 
agency; 
v) active groups reported, 2000-2011, DIA and DNA; 
Researchers have calculated the above indexes on 1000 base and then moved to include them into 
the MPI. In particular, after a correlation test, the indexes were included for each municipality as an 
average value of them. 
Since DNA and DIA refused to make available part of the asked data due to the secrecy and 
sensibility of the information contained, the authors of the research had to work on the reports of 
DNA and DIA to complete the set qualifying which group is present and where. For each type of 
organization is computed an average level of activity for each municipality. 
The figure below represents MPI for Italy. 
As described, MPI appoint the presence of the phenomenon in light of crimes committed by Mafia 
associations, e.g. murderers, public procurement corruption, but it is not able to capture all those 
cultural features that are at the core of the phenomenon. It falls short to detect the presence of Mafia 
when, for instance, a trial end by acquittal due to possible threats against the judge or to the key 
witness of the prosecution. Corruption and clientelism are not caught by the MPI until they are 
discovered or reported to the police, not so likely where omertà still stands. Especially these places 
marked by a general lack of good citizenship are breeding ground for organized crime and until they 
do not enter the net of justice. This index assigns low level of Mafia presence outside the areas 
typically known to be affected by Mafia presence. Hence it do not capture the interactions and the 
institutional bonds that allowed Mafia to develop. 
                                               
74Assets confiscated as a result of preventative and criminal confiscation orders in relation to serious and organised 
crime offences foreseen by article 51, Section 3-bis of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, e.g. mafia-related 
crimes, organised crime, counterfeiting, trafficking in human beings. 
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.  
The last figure plots jointly presence of Cosa Nostra, Camorra, 'Ndrangheta, Puglia Criminal 
organizations and others. 
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Chapter 4 
EVOLUTION OF MAFIA 
This section should discuss the evolution of Sicilian Mafia, underlining, by the use of historical 
events, the crucial relevance of institutions ties to the Mafia. Since I have already considered the pre 
Unitarian history of Mafia, I will disclose some significant event for three different period in which 
Mafia had different patterns. At first stage it was severe and influential, but at same time central 
authorities passed strict laws against banditry and mafiosi, e.g. Pica's law. During the fascism it was 
weakened by the military repression and some members migrated to the United States. Towards the 
end of WWII Mafia seemingly regains its legs. After WWII, Mafia consolidated its bond with 
central authorities and  politicians, it awarded huge number of public procurement for decades, it 
entered dramatically the illegal drug markets and it openly killed people representing the Italian 
institution, e.g. Falcone and Borsellino. 
 
4.1. 1861-1920 Liberal State 
 
The word Mafia could be referred to the Sicilian phenomenon or, more generally, to associations of 
organized-crime. Examples of these secret associations of organized crime include Camorra, 
‘Ndrangheta or Sacra Corona Unita. These organizations operated respectively in Campania, 
Calabria and partly in Puglia. Due to their complexities both in structure and in operations, it was 
difficult for their activities to be visible at that time. The reason for this was not because they did 
not ascend following a particular event, but rather a systematically accumulating practices and 
behaviors that developed over a long period of time until the formation of what we know as Mafia 
today. The word originated in 1863 from a dialectal comedy, “I mafiusi di la Vicaria”, written by 
Placido Rizzotto. The script represented the prison of Palermo, where a group of prisoners acted 
according to 'respect and humility' and used specific jargon. This comedy played an important role 
for the common diffusion of the word that was previously known with a positive connotation 
associated to it
75
. In 1865 the word Mafia appeared officially for the first time. The two documents 
where the word was first used in 1865 are the letter of a Public Security member of Carini, nearby 
Palermo, who justifies unlawful imprisonment and murder committed by the Mafia and the 
document that was signed by the prefect, Antonio Filippo Gualterio, to the Internal Ministry
76
. 
However, there are evidences of an earlier use of this locution that came from a private document of 
General Alessandro Della Rovere in a letter sent to Palermo in 1861 addressed to Genova Thaon Di 
                                               
75Pitrè vedi dove 
76 Dickie, 2007 
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Revel. Writing about the condition of Sicily, he said to perceive that: “qui v’è pure la camorra, non 
meno cattiva della napoletana. La chiamano Maffia”77. This event is of central significance for the 
literature about Mafia. In fact it allowed us to claim that Camorra is the first known Mafia-like 
organisation, as its name implies. If Della Rovere used the locution Camorra to identify factors 
peculiar to Mafia, it could have meant that Mafiousi behaviours were already acknowledged in 
Campania. This shed lights on the possible earlier advent of Camorra in Naples with respect to 
Mafia in Sicily. Nowadays, Mafia is often confuse with Cosa Nostra. Even though the latter give us 
a glimpse and idea of the above subject matter Cosa Nostra was a more recent Sicilian set up of the 
Sicilian Mafia, characterised by a strong pyramidal structured that is often time presumed to be the 
advent of the Mafia existence. Cosa Nostra is certainly one of the most famous and dominant kind 
of Mafia’s organisation, but it is far from being the ancestor of all the others. As mentioned earlier, 
there are different Mafia-type groups and, among them Sicilian Mafia is quite present of the 
national territory, however each kind of Mafia remained for long located at their original lands and 
only in a second moment they moved to northern Italy. In the next section I explain how it evolved 
over the past years. 
As mentioned in previous chapter, they took advantage of the weak institutions characterizing post 
Unitarian Italy and practiced various forms of activities e.g cattle rustling, theft and kidnapping. 
Besides, they introduced themselves as defender and promoter of the public order and enforcer of 
properties rights, mediating to those whose goods were stolen in exchange for money. The 
corruption of officials and judges, and an extensive information network represented the 
cornerstone of this association. Mafia as an association of organized-crime could have originated 
before 1861 as evidenced brought by the Magistrate Pietro Callà Ullua on August 3
rd
, 1838 said: “ci 
sono “fratellanze dette partiti” dipendenti da un capo, un possidente o un arciprete”78. During the 
first years of Unitarian Italy, the conditions did not improve and the government wanted the laws to 
be respected everywhere, as it was in the north, and it started to reform the Island thanks to new and 
“modern” regulations. Apart for the reforms on landholdings already mentioned, one of these new 
reforms was done thanks to the so called Pica's law. It was signed on 1863 and was conceived to 
repress banditry in the “infected” provinces. It is worth noting that no Sicilian provinces were 
included in the first list of infected provinces. This law was approved by the parliament as an 
emergency measure but later it became permanent due to the Crispi law of 1866. The threat posed 
by brigandage on the Southern mainland was the reasons for this strong repression. It gave special 
power to police forces of those areas declared to be “in a state of brigandage”, e.g. they could even 
shot who resisted the arrest when found with the apparent intention of committing a crime. Initially 
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78Marino, Storia della Mafia pg. 18 
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the law made no clear distinction between highwayman and the camorra member, even if, among 
other punishments, it considered the possibility to impose force resettlement to ‘camorristi', 
vagabonds and bandits. The report of 1865 was impressive for the high numbers of applications: 
5.212 death sentences, 5.044 arrested
79
 and more than 6.000 were forced-resettled 54 villages 
destructed
80
. The enforced resettlement, called confino was one of the policies provided by this law. 
According to it, the arrested people shall be transferred in prisons in other regions, in order to avoid 
the relationship with other member arrested and the member surrounding the prisons. This policy 
might have brought criminals to know other territories and expand their economic and social 
interests. It is commonly accepted that confino played a crucial role for the expansion of Mafia in 
Italy. 
The Unitary Government perceived the Sicilian population as ungovernable in general. Furthermore, 
there was the introduction of taxes and the obligatory military service that lead to a decrease in 
labor supply and increase in crimes as a result of the increased in poverty and decrease of living 
conditions. Fortuzzi (1875)
81
 wrote that liberal methods were unsuitable to the character of the 
island's population: “certo, un azzardoso e terribile esperimento è quello che da anni si sta facendo dal 
nuovo Governo nazionale, quello cioè di governare popoli come questi[…] con leggi e ordinamenti 
all’inglese o alla belga, che suppongono un popolo colto e morale come colà, o come almeno nella parte 
superiore della penisola”. In order to avoid the military service, part of those obliged people decided 
to become brigands and escape the hometown. From Marino (1998), data on crimes have shown a 
drastic tendency to increase, especially in Sicily. Murderers recorded in Sicily are far more 
abundant than elsewhere. A critical event was Notarbartolo murder, the first “excellent cadaver”, a 
high member of society. Notarbartolo was the director of a major publicly owned bank which was 
protected by unreliable politicians
82
. He discovered an excessive financial supply toward 'La 
Trincacria' and 'Genaurdi', respectively, a shipping company of Palermo and a sulphur-exporting 
company. He sent some letter to central authorities, as the minister of agriculture Miceli, in order to 
claim the impossibility to further safeguard the interests of the institution. Huge banking scandals 
arose in connection with his complaint of 1892 against Banca Romana, and he then suffered 
political isolation even though supported by Miceli. He was killed 1893 in a 1
st
 class train journey 
between Termini and Palermo. The hypothesis of revenge was immediately supposed, and, Raffaele 
Palizzolo, previously involved in a defamation towards him, was suspected to be the principal for 
this event, due to his relationship with the Palermitan “lords” and with the Banco di Sicilia, where 
the victim was succeeded as director. The accused was imprisoned on 1899 and since then three 
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trials were held, but for refusal of the court, these trials were held in the north, Bologna and 
Florence respectively in 1899, 1901, 1903 and concluded on July 1904 with the final acquittal for 
lack of evidence declaration of 1904 (Lupo, 1993). After the acquittal declaration of Florence court, 
Sicilians seemed to be glad for this, From Colajanni (1900, pg. 12)
83
: “quando fu comunicata la 
notizia dell'assoluzione, in gran parte della Sicilia si festeggiò […] per la difesa del 'buon nome dei siciliani' 
dalle calunnie cui venivano sottoposti dal processo. Quella sentenza significava per loro un fatto chiaro: la 
Giustizia italiana decretava ufficialmente che la mafia non esiste”. This inconclusive event is of 
particular relevance to have an idea of how deeply intertwine are the interests of mafiosi with the 
ones of political class. However, such a trial ended during the new Giolitti government and, during 
his “era” (1901 – 1914), two important reforms took place: a new electoral law was applied for 
universal male suffrage in 1913 and it allowed collective enterprises to ask for loans from banks and 
to have their own direct contracts with landowners, without any intermediary. These 
transformations led to the victory of several socialist mayors in the island and it eliminated the role 
of mediator in contracts, often represented by the mafia. To put a break to the imminent “danger” 
represented by the left wing movement, the mafia chose the path of the coalition, thus tightening 
alliance with the Catholic Church in Sicily, which was also concerned about developments of 
Marxist ideology in the countryside. 
In 1915, Italy entered the First World War, and thousands of young people called to join army 
deserted. Many deserters had to live hiding themselves on the island and surviving on little crimes. 
Because of the lack of labour supply, and the increasing meat demand, many plots of land were 
reserved for grazing. A direct consequence of a less present labour forces in the fields and a great 
number of Sicilian deserters asked protection from the Mafia, the scarcity of meat led to increase 
cattle-rustling that consequently increased the demand for the services of the Mafia to mediate with 
bandits for recovering their cattle. In fact, the intensifying cattle theft made the landlords turned 
more and more often to the Mafia, rather than relying on the powerless State authorities, to have at 
least a part of the herds back. To summarize, Mafia associations were able to mediate between 
landowners and bandits and between middle classes and landowners. Post-war Italy faced a period 
of crisis and the banditry spread along with the recruitment in the Mafia ranks. In Sicily Brigandage 
became increasing evident, something like an armed wing that both Mafia, and political members, 
would exploit in order to satisfy their personal interests.
84 
The case of Notarborlo, extensively 
discussed by Colajanni (1900), is a proof of the illegal involvement of state institutions. 
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4.2. 1920-1945 Fascism period 
The Sicilian socio-economic environment was therefore controlled by Mafia, but since the fascism 
advent, it “cohabited” with it for few years and then entered into a critical phase. Mussolini 
identified Mafia as a motive of separatism because contrary to his totalitarianism ambitions. Hence, 
after a short and stable period, he decided to stop the illegal collaborations among Mafia members 
and the society. In 1924 a strong repressive campaign to eradicate Mafia begun and Cesare Mori 
was appointed in 1925 to the Palermo prefect, which was given a legitimate power to defeat Cosa 
Nostra. The squadriglie, composed by military and national Police agents, were successful in 
arresting huge number of bandits, mafiosi and fugitives. Mussolini attempted to recoup and create a 
support from big landowners in order to interrupt the established relations with gabelloti and the 
influence of the latter on peasants with the constitution of the fascist trade unions that should 
manage those relations instead. This might have been one of the worst periods in the Mafia history, 
a period in which central state almost destroyed Mafia. These years were characterised by 
considerable convictions and arrests of men affiliated to Sicilian Mafia. In particular, through a 
series of raids, particularly the Provinces of Palermo, Agrigento, Caltanissetta and Enna were the 
most influenced by this winds of repression
85
. The actions of Mori were sustained by a heavy 
application of forced-resettlement policy and violent military raid in those areas typically affected 
by the Mafia. A significant event is given by the 'Assedio di Gangi', a raid taking place on the 1
st
 
January 1926. Mori described that night in his writings which was reported by Duggan (1987)
86
. 
He affirmed that criminals went back to their home because of cold and, since police forces knew 
their locations, they made several raids determined to “humiliate and dishonour” the mafiosi. Mori 
wrote: “Dissi ai miei uomini di entrare nelle case dei criminali, dormire nei loro letti, bere il loro vino, 
mangiare le loro galline, uccidere il loro bestiame e venderne la carne ai contadini della zona a prezzo 
ridotto". Seemingly, women and children were victim of kidnapping and probably abused but there 
are no official evidences for this statement. The main ideal was to destroy the common sense of 
honour and to proof to the community how powerless the mafiosi were. I report from Pezzino (1999, 
pg. 40) some steps of Mussolini's speech
87
 to the Deputy Chamber in 1927 about the spread of the 
Mafia in Sicily and its successful repression: 
“Vengo alla mafia, signori deputati! Anche qui parlerò chiaro: non m'importa nulla se 
domani la stampa di tutto il mondo s'impadronirà delle mie cifre. La stampa di tutto il 
mondo però dovrà ammettere che la chirurgia fascista è veramente coraggiosa, è veramente 
tempestiva. Di quando in quando, giungono fino al mio orecchio delle voci dubitose le quali 
                                               
85Pezzino, Paolo 1999 
86
Christopher Duggan, La mafia durante il Fascismo 1987, Rubbettino, con Prefazione di Denis Mack Smith. Cited in 
Lupo (1993, pg. 144) 
87Da Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Legislatura XXVII, 1^ sessione, Discussioni, intervento del capo del 
Governo Benito Mussolini, 26 maggio 1927, pp. 7623-7624 
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orrebbero dare ad intendere che in Sicilia attualmente si esageri, che si mortifica una intera 
regione, che si getta un'ombra sopra un'isola dalle tradizioni nobilissime. Io respingo 
sdegnosamente queste voci, che non possono partire da centri malfamati. 
Signori, è tempo che io vi riveli la mafia. [...] Non si parli di nobiltà e di cavalleria della 
mafia, se non si vuole veramente insultare tutta la Sicilia! 
Quali sono i risultati di quest'opera contro la delinquenza? Notevoli. 
Ecco un bollettino del prefetto Mori [...] 
Nel 1923: 696 abigeati; nel 1926: 126. Le rapine da 1216 sono discese a 298; le estorsioni 
da 238 a 121; i danneggiamenti da 1327 a 815; gli incendi dolosi da 739 a 469. 
Qualcuno mi domanderà: Qualcuno finirà la lotta contro la mafia? Finirà non solo quando 
non ci saranno più mafiosi, ma quando il ricordo della mafia sarà scomparso definivamente 
dalla memoria dei siciliani”. 
In June 1929 Cesare Mori was dismissed, his work completed and Mafia was seemingly destroyed. 
The feared word disappeared from the newspapers, as predicted by Mussolini, and during this 
period the Sicilian population experienced an increase in the legal and civic pride, above all, of the 
police and the judiciacy: what the regime was able to get was, for the first time, coordination 
between the police and the judiciary authorities, and an education based on the respect of law. The 
consequences of these policies affected also Mafia leadership decisions, and after a period of 
intense police operations (1925-1927) they came to the historical emigration towards USA around 
the 30s. Fascism had represented a huge threat for the Mafia engine, nevertheless, some of the 
arrested and resettled members went back to their villages after several years while the legal 
difficulties to find guilty specific crimes committed were still actual. Seemingly, there are narratives 
for which USA secret services collaborated with a member arrested after their immigration from 
Sicily, in exchange for his freedom in order to assure the allies control over the island. This 
agreement should had involved the Mafia Boss Don Calò Vizzini, Lucky Luciano (held in prison in 
USA) and the GMA (Governo Military Alleato). In this way, Anglo-American troop would have 
advanced without firing a shot because the Mafia encountered resistance before them, inviting 
fascist soldiers to lay down their weapons that ended up in their hands. Unfortunately this 
agreement is not sustained by empirical evidences, and the unique relationship evidence, between 
Military Intelligence and Sicilian “lords”, were contained in a report called 'Memorandum sul 
problema della mafia in Sicilia' sent by the American Captain of Military Intelligence W. Scotteal to 
the general Julius Holmes, in Palermo
88
 on october 1943
89
. Accordingly to it, when Sicily came 
under the Italian control, Mafia was "unintentionally" allowed to regain the forces of the past and, 
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from personal informers of Captain Scotte, Mafia had equipped with modern guns and that citizens 
did not believe possible for police forces to defeat Mafia. Moreover the informers claimed that 
high-ranking US officials were influenced by landlords who were “traditionally and 
opportunistically tied to Mafia”. Decisive importance has this passage: “Sotto il fascismo, la mafia non 
era stata interamente debellata, ma veniva almeno tenuta sotto controllo. Invece cresce ed ha raggiunto 
posizioni di rilievo nel Gma. […] sono tre le soluzioni possibili: un'azione diretta ed immediata per 
controllare la mafia; una tregua negoziata con I capimafia; l'abbandono di ogni tentativo di controllare la 
mafia in tutta l'isola”
90
. The fascist repression has finished its efficiency towards the end of the war 
and, especially after the British-American invasion of 1943–44, Mafia, restored previous power and 
position, protected the landed elite from the new class emergence. 
 
4.3. 1946 – 1992 post war and Mafia evolution 
I bring here the story of Salvatore Giuliano, former bandit and colonel of the EVIS
91
,because its 
importance that goes beyond the Sicilian island context: it shows, in fact, worrying interweaving 
between state institutions and criminal contests, the widespread use of violence in political 
competition, the involvement of significant sectors of the government apparatus and political forces 
in what we might call the first act of a "strategy of tension" that will develop in other decisive 
moments in the history of Italy. 
During the celebration of the May day in the surrounding area of Palermo in 1947, the provincial  
secretary of the socialist party took the word and by the hills and behind the surrounding rocks 
started a firefight attack causing the tragic death of eleven people, including four children, and more 
than thirty wounded, some very serious. The massacre, still remembered as "the massacre of 
Portella della Ginestra"
92
, was attributed to the bandit Salvatore Giuliano, but the circumstances 
reported by the chronicles claimed about more than one killer since the shots arrived from different 
spots. The trial towards Giuliano discovered relations and collusions between mafiosi, linked to 
large landowners, and elements of the Italian Government, especially in the person of the then 
Interior Minister Mario Scelba. Giuliano himself, who up to the time of the massacre, was 
considered by Sicilian peasants a sort of Robin Hood for his actions against the rich landowners of 
the region in 1950, was mysteriously assassinated by one of his lieutenants, Gaspare Pisciotta, and 
then, in 1954, also the latter was poisoned by unknown killers left prison. The massacre of Portella 
della Ginestra remains one of the unsolved crimes of Italy's republican history and probably one of 
the first clear signs, though never officially tested, the collusion between the Sicilian Mafia and 
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political power of Rome
93
. 
After World War II, Sicilian society went through a profound transformation: the economy which 
was based on agriculture declined in favour of other sectors such as trade and service sector. Cosa 
Nostra also had to adapt quickly, and it is what it did expertly. But to do that, it had to establish 
direct links, more than in the past, with the politics and representatives of the largest political party 
in Italy and Sicily is, Christian Democrats party (Democrazia Cristiana). Through this pact Mafia 
gained profits, thanks to rigged contracts, entering the construction market and seeking new 
“neighbourhoods” in major cities, through the recruitment of staff for national authorities position. 
In addition, Mafia obtained a sort of increasing immunity in its promotion towards political sphere. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, Cosa Nostra converted itself from an agrarian Mafia-type to an urban 
context, and this translated into new opportunities such as the undertaking of public and private 
contracts led by strong relationship with politicians and entrepreneurs as well. Throughout the 80s, 
it entered the drugs market but the real drastic change was required during the 1990s because of the 
appearance of the informers, or the so called justice collaborator. This was a crucial factor that 
signed the begin of an unstable period among the criminal groups. However, some evidences 
strengthening my claim for which Mafia was almost above the law during post war period, is given 
by the trials ended with a non-guilty declaration. A traditional one comes from the trial of Bari in 
1969, when 64 mafiosi were accused of conspiracy, including Salvatore Riina, Bernardo 
Provenzano, Leoluca Bargarella and Luciano Liggio. . The trial ended with the complete acquittal, 
for lack of evidence, of the accused. On the one hand, Christian Democrats politicians were able to 
directing large amounts of votes for their own seats. on the other hand, politicians gain huge 
amounts of money in exchange for their favouritisms. 
Following the massacre of “via Carini” in September 1982, in which the prefect of Palermo, 
General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa was killed; the state authorities began to take adequate 
measures to face this phenomenon. Other murders happened in this time: Pio La Torre, secretary of 
the communist Italian party, on august also the medical examiner Paolo Giaccone; on November 
Calogero Zucchetto, police agent of Palermo. In next years the murders were not arrested. But soon, 
the threat given by the figure of informer became a reality when the famous trial against 475 
members of Cosa Nostra took place in 1986. The main reason for the success of such a trial was 
given by the crucial presence of Tommaso Buscetta, former member of the so called high Mafia. He 
confessed and reported the judge Giovanni Falcone how Cosa Nostra perpetrated the crimes, their 
strategies, the secreted codes and vast quantity of informations useful to prepare the offensives 
criminal system. All these acquired facts signed a historical turning point for the anti-mafia bureau, 
the evidence reach directly from Falcone (1991, pg 41): “Prima di lui (Buscetta), non avevo – non 
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avevamo – che un'idea superficiale del fenomeno mafioso. Con lui abbiamo cominciato a guardarvi dentro”. 
The strong protection of Buscetta by the official authorities transmitted the possibility for others to 
be efficiently protected against Mafia revenge. The so called informers, one time mafiosi that 
signed a protection contract with the State in exchange for secrets information and revelations. 
Paolo Borsellino and Falcone instituted the Maxi Trial (Maxiprocesso) against Cosa Nostra based 
on Buscetta’s admissions. It refers to the nickname that was given in a journalistic level to a 
criminal trial held in Palermo for crimes of mafia-type association, of which the existence of Cosa 
Nostra was finally judicially confirmed using also an exact name. Included In these crimes were 
murder, drug trafficking, extortion, criminal association and others. It was Alfonso Giordano that 
presided over the court, among advisory assistants there was Pietro Grasso and Giuseppe Ayala was 
the crown prosecutor. The day of the first trial was the 10th of February 1986 until January 30th, 
1992, the day of the final judgment of the Court of Cassation. The maxi trial owes its nickname to 
its huge proportions: the first instance involved 475 defendants, then they decreased to 460 during 
the trial, in addition it had approximately 200 lawyers. The first trial ended with heavy sentences: 
nineteen life sentences and prison terms for a total of 2665 years of imprisonment against Mafia’s 
members. Almost all of these convictions were confirmed by the Supreme Court. 
This was the biggest criminal trial ever held in the world. For this reason a large hall, called "aula 
bunker", was quickly built in a few months, next to the “Ucciardone” prison. This bunker was also 
equipped with a computerized system for the storage of the acts, without which a trial of such 
proportions would not have been possible. 
The historian Paolo Pezzino (1995), focusing on the level of representation that the state gave in the 
fight against the Mafia confirmed that the Maxi Trial was a turning point, a basis for future. It was 
not the first mafia trial but one in which the engagement of the institutions was crucial. This trial 
was followed by others. Meanwhile, Cosa Nostra tried to recover and put in place some of the most 
famous attack: Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino were dramatically killed by Cosa Nostra, 
respectively on May and July 1992 (Pezzino, 1999). Giovanni Falcone was a natural candidate to be 
the president of the coordination office of the anti-mafia investigations, although he was often 
opposed. The man who was the symbol of the fight against the Mafia, with his wife Francesca 
Morvillo and three of the seven body guards, were killed. Exactly 57 days later, on the 19th of July 
1992, Paolo Borsellino went along with his security detail in via D'Amelio, where his mother lived. 
A Fiat 126 packed with dynamite parked under Borsellino’s mother house, was detonated when the 
judge passed. He died together with his five body guards: Emanuela Loi, Agostino Catalano, 
Vincenzo Li Muli, Walter Eddie Cosina and Claudio Traina were killed. 
The period was considered the most dark for Cosa Nostra and the consequently increased attention 
of juridical institutions as well as mass medias, created a kind of negligence towards Camorra and 
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‘Ndrangheta which took full control over drug trafficking and expanded the domain in the northern 
Italian regions. After massacres of Falcone and Borsellino, general fear and silence seemed to have 
decreased because many people had the courage to manifest anti-Mafia desires; magistrates and 
judges held lectures about legality. Finally, on February 15
th
 1993 Salvatore Riina, considered the 
chief of Cosa Nostra from 1982 until 1993
94
was arrested. All these events made a part of the society 
to refuse and distance themselves from Mafia power. Nowadays Mafia appear less “visible” than 
past years. In such a way it could chose activities that ensured equally the wealth and the control of 
the territory but avoiding bloody conflict. By portraying Mafia activities, Falcone (1991) underlined 
few times that Mafia was based on strong values and that American Mafia operated in opposite 
direction. It is the case for gambling houses and prostitution, and the judge is somehow satisfied by 
this evidence. In fact he wrote “Ci vedo tutto lo spessore di differenze culturali che si sono 
accentuate con il passare degli anni”.95 This make us claim that honour code was still respected 
nonetheless the transformation and enrichment of the organisation. The shift from an agrarian 
society to one made of: drug trafficking, recycling of capital, investments in service and good 
market, e.g. building trade and memorial services, occurred in compliance with the values that 
originates it. 
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Conclusions 
The subject treated in this work is of central importance in the Italian history and still has 
central importance at a national level. Throughout the literature review, I have tried to highlight the 
most significant features that allowed its emergence and the key event of its effective evolution. It 
should be clear that the Mafia has to be treated as a multi-faced phenomenon in order to have a 
consistent image of the problem. The ubiquitous interactions among the determinants is not 
negligible and complexity appear to be at the heart of the Mafia understanding. Factors such as 
cultural aspects and common behaviour had to be taken under serious consideration when assessing 
this phenomenon that is noticeable only at the last stage of its activity, when the crime is committed. 
 It has been shown how the documents of the XIX century assessed the phenomenon and 
they still have strong explanatory power. Franchetti (1876), for instance, proposed the idea of Mafia 
as an industry for violence, which has proven to be effective in explaining the context in which 
early Sicilian Mafia operated. The recent development of this hypothesis, made by Santino (1990), 
Gambetta (1993), Pezzino (1995), came to a theory of industry for protection based on violence as a 
means to achieve the common objectives. Earlier, Cutrera (1900) explained extremely precisely the 
particular character of the Sicilian peasant, which was shaped by historical domination. These 
peculiarities gave rise to a system of friendship relations and to the so called clientelism which is 
crucial to understand the interaction among different social classes. The modern literature, e.g. 
Bandiera (2003), Buonanno et al. (2012), Dimico et al. (2014), gave us a strong feedback on the 
effectiveness/validity/robustness? of historical Mafia measurements and estimates. 
 Omertà and honour code are vital cog in the Mafia wheel. Nevertheless, they are also a store 
of dangerous values and ideals, as these could lead to self-management of private dispute, to 
obstruct judicial investigation or develop a mistrust towards central authorities. Along with these 
two traits, I have pointed out that Mafia activities were often supported by high officials of central 
authorities, e.g. Notarbortolo case, Ciancimino arrest, and this bond could perhaps be its main 
source of power and protection. More recently, illicit drug trafficking and corruption for public 
procurement composed its principal source of income and expansion.  
 Finally, I have briefly cited the evolution of Sicilian Mafia, Cosa Nostra and the turning 
point made by the judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino who reversed the plan of action 
against the Mafia system throughout the strong protection of the informers. Their pioneering work 
has shown that only treating Mafia as an extraordinary phenomenon, it becomes possible to destroy 
it. Unfortunately, he was right when he wrote that “temo che la magistratura torni la vecchia routine: I 
mafiosi che fanno il loro mestiere da un lato, i magistrati che fanno più o meno bene il loro dall'altro, e alla resa dei 
conti, palpabile, l'inefficienza dello Stato”. Moreover, with the recent trials in Rome, Mafia Capitale and 
the scandal of Expo 2015 for corruption in public procurement have shown, in my opinion, that the 
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little interest of the Italian population could be an opportunity for Mafias to develop. It might not be 
a behaviour that relied on omertà but it is given by general tolerance of a phenomena that had 
entered the Italian history more than a century ago. Clientelism and corruption are current and 
crucial features in the Italian society. As they were in the past, it might be possible that they are 
practiced by actors not belonging to any Mafia organization but they are peculiar to a context that 
tolerate and accept it in some way. 
  
Some possible future works could aim to analyse if the MPI, developed by Transcrime and 
presented above, is consistent with indexes suggested by the recent scholars for Sicily. Alternatively, 
a new index could be developed aimed at capturing the perception of Mafia by a society. Again, in 
line with the work of Dimico et al. (2012), it could be possible to better investigate if more valuable 
crops in Calabria have brought to the rise of Mafia-like organization and if, also here, there were 
different patterns of development in rich and poor areas. An aspect that was not completely solved 
is the question about land fragmentation as a determinant for private protection and indeed, to Mafia 
development. It could be very interesting to look also at the relationship between political parties 
and Mafia associations. Particularly, investigating whether Mafia is still tied to Forza Italia, as 
shown by Buonanno et al. (2014); or instead, if it has shifted to the party in charge of the majority 
or another one. A final hint of research could be to investigate the different practices and procedures 
that these organization develop contextually to the place and time they experienced. Their early 
expansion of Sicilian Mafia in Italy saw an increasing use of corruption and public procurement; 
while, it have seemingly expanded to USA for drug trafficking and to escape from the net of justice. 
Future research could also explore if the claimed Mafia bond with the Church has brought to real 
advantages to them and to test if the correlation with left parties has historically be unprofitable, or 
impossible, as insist Calderone
96
. My final observation relates to the development of new 
technologies. These new means of communication made the criminal practices way easier to 
coordinate and implement; thus, posing serious challenges to the investigative bodies. An example 
of this is money laundering, whose inquiry has to follow specific tracks and pattern of research. 
This clearly impacts also the quality of the economic, and social, research that scholars can carry 
out on the subject, who will face constantly more challenges to obtain tracking data of criminal 
activities. Corruption and clientelism 
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